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NATIONAL  POLICIES  SHAPING  INCOME  INEQUALITY  IN  TRANSITION




The thesis  aims to  investigate  the influence of  national  policies on income distribution
patterns in the countries that share similar historical legacies.  The focus is on the post-
communist countries that went through transition process. Moving from central planned to
market economy inevitably lead to the rise of income inequality, although the countries
experienced it to different extent: some managed to maintain income inequality at a low
level, while others relatively failed to provide the social safety net for their citizens. The
study is based on the analysis of a large number of statistical sources concerning the data on
two selected group of countries – the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Baltic States –
from 1985, when first processes of economy liberalisation started, to 2014, which marks the
countries’ ten years anniversary within the European Union. The former group represents
one of  the  most  successful  countries  on the European continent  in  terms of  mitigating
income inequality,  while  the  latter  one  has  the  highest  income inequality  levels  in  the
European  Union.  When  controlling  for  significant  macroeconomic  and  demographic
indicators, such as the level of urbanisation and adjusted wage share, the thesis explicitly
elaborates  on  the  role  of  governmental  policies  of  the  countries  of  interest  from their
independence  until  2014.  Policies  such  as  privatisation,  taxation,  and  cash  benefits
distribution turned out to have big influence on income inequality level in a long term.
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Introduction
The study is focused on the problem of income inequality that has recently been rising
everywhere in the world. Some countries manage to mitigate market economies negative
outcomes while others do not, although the situation worldwide leaves much to be desired.
As Oxfam International reports (Pimentel et al., 2018), more than 80% of wealth generated
in 2017, ended up in 1% of the richest households. At the same time, half of the world’s
population did not improve their income situation.
The problem has not only humanitarian importance – rising income inequality exposes the
most vulnerable groups of population to market forces. Income inequality should be in the
governments focus due to its possible economic consequences – suppressing aggregated
demand and leading to stagnation, and political ones, since high concentration of wealth
can lead to elimination of the democratic order and the establishment of an oligarchy.
Previously, scholars who paid attention to the phenomenon either took large number of
countries  for  comparison  in  order  to  find  out  possible  explanations  for  the  growth  of
income inequality (Kuznets, 1955, Atkinson & Micklewright, 1992), or rather concentrated
on a detailed analysis of one or a small group of countries, highlighting similar processes
that  took  place  (Garner  & Terrell,  1997).  Existing  literature  lacks  small  cross-country
comparisons  of  transition  countries,  which  might  give  more  insight  into  possible
explanations for income inequality rise.
Thus, in this study, we compare two groups of countries that, having similar experience,
performed extremely different Gini coefficients while following, from the first sight, the
same development paths. Particularly our interest lies in the experience of post-communist
countries, that used to function in the conditions of central planned economy, then in 1990s
shifted towards market one, undergoing similar transition processes, and, in the end, joined
the European Union (EU). In other words, this work tends to assess the impact of national
policies, assuming that international agenda should have affected the countries of interest in
a rather similar way.
The cases selected represent two differently performing groups of the states:  the Baltic
group that includes  Estonia,  Latvia,  and Lithuania and has the highest level of income
inequality  in  the  EU  context,  and  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  whose  income
distribution is closer to that of Scandinavian region countries. Before 1990, the countries
operated under the umbrella of the Soviet Union, even though back then Czechoslovakia
enjoyed somewhat  greater independence in its  decision making,  while  the Baltic  States
were the part of the Soviet Union. All the five countries gained independence in the same
period of time – Czechoslovakia in 1989 from the communist rule and then the Czech and
Slovak Republics in 1993 from each other, the Baltic States gained independence in 1991.
The countries started the process of negotiations with the EU also relatively at same time:
in the middle of 1990s, and finally were accepted to the European Union in 2004, meaning
that they fulfilled the necessary criteria. Such consequence of the events indicates relative
similarities in the countries’ development, which creates conditions for a comparative study.
The general time framework covers the years of 1985-2014 – from the first steps towards
economy liberalisation to marking the ten year anniversary of becoming EU member states.
Since the chosen countries experienced relatively similar  macroeconomic processes and
had to adopt rather similar regulations with regard to key policy aspects in order to be
accepted to the European Union, their comparison will be likely to reveal the impact of the
policies designed and implemented by national governments in the last decades on income
inequality.
In  order  to  achieve  the  research  aim,  first  existing  literature  on  income  inequality,  in
transition countries in particular, was reviewed and summarised. Secondly, a large amount
of data from 1985 to 2014 was analysed, and the differences in estimations were assessed.
Third, in order to assess income inequality problem, the most relevant indicators that exist
in  modern  databases  were  chosen.  Finally,  a  comparative  analysis  that  revealed  some
common and distinct patterns of the countries was made.
Thus, in this study, we used the most similar system design (MSSD) model that helps to
contrast  similar  preconditions  and  their  different  outcomes.  The  data  on  the  chosen
countries is collected by a number of European databases, such as Eurostat, OECD, but
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only during more recent years. The main problem of a lack or poor reliability of the data
lies in the approach first used by communist countries, that tried to manipulate data for
ideological  reasons,  and  second  by  countries  in  transition,  that  during  first  years  of
independence did not have thorough methodological design to conduct such researches.
However,  a number of scholars had already assessed the problem of income inequality,
including the estimation of income inequality levels. This study uses such findings as a
primary source of information, for the years when unified databases with balanced data did
not exist.
Therefore,  in  the  case  of  a  small-number  country  comparison  based  on  approximate
estimations of the necessary data, regression analysis is of little help. Instead, qualitative
analysis  is  applied  that  gives  deeper  insight  in  the  real  political,  economic,  and  social
situations of the countries of interest. Such an approach also helps avoid conclusions due to
missing data.
Nevertheless,  the  findings  of  this  research  should  be  treated  rather  carefully  due  to
aforementioned limitations of the data. The final results explain general trends of income
inequality,  while  smaller  changes  across  or  within  the  countries  cannot  be  assessed
precisely using such approximate data.
The thesis consists of four chapters and is structured as follows: Chapter One summarises
the  findings  of  scholars  who  studied  income  inequality  in  capitalist,  communist,  and
transition countries, and outlined possible explanations of the phenomenon and its driving
forces. Chapter Two provides the choice of theoretical framework and methodology for an
independent research. In Chapter Three, we seek to trace the trends of income inequality
and plot them against a number of macroeconomic and demographic indicators, such as
urbanisation level and wage share of income, expecting to find low or even no correlation.
Chapter Four concentrates on workers union bargaining power and national redistributive
policies, that include privatisation, taxation, and benefit distribution. The comparison across
two differently performing country groups tends to reveal the main dissimilarities and, thus,
find out the possible causes of income inequality rise.
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Chapter One. Income inequality: measurements, causes, and implications
Inequality has existed throughout all  years of humanity, scholars yet argue that the gap
between  the  rich  and  the  poor  first  significantly  increased  at  the  time  of  Industrial
Revolution, with the invention of new means of production that facilitated productivity and
skyrocketed the output (for example, see Fiorentini & Montani, 2012; Piketty, 2014).
The first attempts to understand and measure the phenomenon of income inequality were
made  early  in  20th century.  However,  the  problem  as  such  attracted  the  attention  of
policymakers after the Second World War. When re-establishing the world order after the
disaster, the general public and, hence, policymakers became much more concerned about
“fairness” of the governmental  actions  and more supportive towards welfare and social
safety  nets.  The  large  gap  between  households  incomes  was  mostly  noticeable  in
developing  countries,  but  not  in  the  'old  capitalist'  regimes,  where  governments  were
concerned  with  social  protective  measures  during  so  called  thirty  glorious  years  of
capitalism (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012).
The  economic  liberalisation  of  the  1980s,  followed  by  a  brand  new  phenomenon  of
transition  economies,  that  had  to  design  their  market  and  legislative  institutions  from
scratch, against the background of 'second globalization era', resulted in a new splash of
income inequality. It affected all the countries around the world, regardless of whether they
were capitalist or communist, developed or developing (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012, p.79).
In this chapter, the ways of measuring income inequality, possible causes and preconditions
of the phenomenon in the context of capitalist and transitional economies, as well as the
practical consequences of high income inequality level are reviewed.
1.1. Measurements of income inequality
The first scholar who attempted to measure income inequality was the American economist
Max Lorenz (1905), who introduced a graphical representation of the unequal spread of
wealth among the population. The graph shows an ideally equal distribution of income – in
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other words, if every member of the society received exactly the same amount of money –
as a straight line. The coefficient of the actual income distribution curve's deflection from
this “line of perfect equality” represents the depth of income inequality: the more the line
based on real evidence goes further from the “ideal situation”, the more unequal in terms of
income the society is. The calculations are based on the comparison of households: what
percentage  of  total  national  income  is  possessed  by  groups  of  low,  middle,  and  high
income.  The  percentage  of  households  is  plotted  on  the  x-axis,  and  the  percentage  of
income – on the y-axis.
The next attempt to measure income inequality resulted into a coefficient representation
based on the  graphical  Lorenz  curve.  The indicator,  that  is  the  most  widely  used  also
nowadays,  was  conceived  by  the  Italian  statistician  Corrado  Gini  (1912).  The  index
theoretically can take the values from 0 to 1, where the former one represents the situation
of perfect equality, and the latter one, thus, expresses the total inequality – where only one
person  possesses  all  the  national  income.  The  formula  is  sophisticated,  and  takes  into
account not only possible revenues of the household such as earnings, self-employment
activities, benefits, and the losses such as taxes and social contributions, but also is adjusted
to the size and structure of the household, meaning that different values are assigned to the
members who are not economically active, like children or pensioners.
The Gini coefficient has its methodological flaws, too. One of the main criticisms towards
this approach lies in the fact that the number catches only the gap in households' incomes,
while its decomposition is hard, thus it does not reflect, for example, the situation with
poverty, or the distribution of income within particular groups. In other words, in theory, for
example, a Gini coefficient can take smaller and smaller values within one country, but
along with overall decrease in per capita income the percentage of the population living
beyond the poverty line might be increasing at the same time (Mellor, 1989).
There is also evidence that the Gini coefficient is overly sensitive to some particular parts
of distribution, and the scholars assess it differently. One group of economists argues that
the indicator gives more weight to the changes in the middle of the distribution (Pressman,
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2013), while others claim that actually, on the contrary, Gini index is more sensitive to the
changes in the lower or upper parts (Gastwirth, 2017).
There are also over  a dozen of other  measures of inequality proposed by the scientific
community, particularly by econometricians. The Atkinson index (1970) is more sensitive
in  determining  which  income group attributed  to  the  inequality  the  most,  and is  more
appreciated by the scholars who focus their studies on poverty and are more concerned with
welfare policies application of the results (Bellù & Liberati, 2006). The Hoover index, also
known  as  the  Robin  Hood  index,  gives  an  insight  to  how  much  income  should  be
“extracted” from the richer part of the population and redistributed among the poorer in
order to achieve perfect equality (Hoover, 1936). Theil's index (1972) is based on statistical
information theory and can also take the values between 0 and 1. It is also largely used by
economists due to its properties that help to observe the distribution of income not only
between, but also within income groups. However, the measure is rather complex, and there
are various intuitive interpretations of the index. The most general one is that if all the
income groups had their “fair share” of income, the index would be equal to zero. Since it
is  particularly  sensitive  to  income transfers  from the  poor  to  the  rich,  another  popular
interpretation is as follows: the greater the transfers, the steeper the Theil line is (Conceição
& Ferreira, 2000).
Decile  ratios  are  also  commonly  used  for  income  distribution  analysis  as
complementarities  to  more  complex  indexes  such  as  the  ones  described  above.
Representing a rather simple way of measurement and being extremely sensitive towards
outliers, such a comparison gives a better insight into the dispersion of national income
among income-based groups (UN, 2015). One of the most popular ways is to compare the
ratios between the richest (D10) and the poorest (D1) deciles to the middle-income one
(D5). Given the same Gini coefficient, greater inequality of income between the richest and
the middle earners group is considered to be a less dangerous sign rather than the same ratio
between the middle class and the poor – when the richest have bigger shares at the expense
of the middle class, not the poor, it is more justified by market forces laws and believed to
be less harmful for economy. Therefore, the analysis of the ratio of deciles or quantiles of
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income distribution, together with Gini or any other coefficient, provides a more clear and
complete picture (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012).
1.2. Causes of income inequality
1.2.1. From Kuznets to Piketty: changing the paradigm
Simon Kuznets (1955) is considered to be the pioneer of investigating income inequality
and its relation to economic growth. In his works, he claimed that economic growth first
naturally  increases  the  inequality  between  the  households,  and  then,  also  naturally,
decreases it, one should just wait for the economy to grow steadily for a number of years.
Kuznets also argued that in order to understand the phenomenon of income inequality, the
internal  division within  the  studied  groups is  needed.  Not  only the composition  of  the
population  should  be  of  a  researchers'  interest,  but  also  the  direction  of  “migration”
between the income groups. The author suggested to study separately 'residents', or those
whose income does not drastically change within the time, and 'migrants', or those who
either increase their income and go upwards, or lose their wealth and move downwards
respectively.
Moreover, the population generations ideally should be also taken into account, since the
offspring of the rich is more likely to stay within the highest income group. The same rule
applies for the poor: they are less likely to improve their financial situation. According to
Kuznets, this happens due to the existence of inequality of savings. Moreover, only the
richest part of the population is actually able to contribute to the savings in the amount that
can be passed to the offspring and, therefore, they can maintain their high income, while
low-income  households  are  not  able  to  save  money  because  they  consume  a  larger
proportion of their incomes, as proved later by Dyan et al. (2004). That is why Kuznets did
not find a reverse U-curve in the case of developing countries.“[T]he wider inequality in
the secular income structure of underdeveloped countries is associated with a much lower
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level of average income per capita”, claimed Kuznets (1955, p.23) assuming, that only the
richest – and smallest – share of the society can “afford” savings.
He also argued that, due to industrialisation, the population migrates from a lower-income
agricultural zones to big cities, and this process only contributes to overall inequality, also
due to the fact that the gap between wages is higher in urbanized zones. It happens, first,
because generally the income of those who live in rural areas is lower than those of city
workers. Agriculture does not allow production of such large returns on the same scale as
industries or services because it is affected by technology to a lesser extent. Secondly, the
urban  population  as  such  is  more  unequal  in  terms  of  income,  depending  on  person's
occupation.
However, as soon as the major part of the population settles down in the cities and only a
small part remain in agricultural areas, income inequality will start to reduce. The argument
was supported by some scholars (see Milanovic, 1996, Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006). Others,
though, did not find such supporting evidence (Li et al., 1998).
Kuznets'  view  on  the  relation  between  income  inequality  and  economic  growth  was
dominant throughout the 20th century. Even though in the latest research the evidence is
rather mixed – the hypothesis was supported in approximately only half of such cases, in
the other half income inequality only increased with economic growth, without performing
a reversed U-shaped curve (Bruno et al., 1998).
The classic Kuznets approach and its implications were challenged recently by the French
economist Thomas Piketty (2014), who admitted the importance of the data collected by
Kuznets,  but  largely criticized his methodology and conclusions.  He extended the time
framework of his research compared to Kuznets, and found that a reversed U-curve does
not comply with the extension of the data frame of the research.
The main argument of Piketty is that Kuznets did not take into account capital income,
which is distributed even more unequally than a labour one. The researcher claims that
unprecedented concentration of wealth first took place in the times of Industrial Revolution,
even though it is almost impossible to access such old and material figures. Using the data
traced back for almost two centuries,  mostly on old capitalist  economies such as Great
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Britain and France, in his research, he introduced another variable – return on capital, and
figured  out  that  global  inequality  is  primarily  the  consequence  of  the  concentration  of
wealth, that, in turn, is a result of a higher returns on capital over the economic growth
through a long term period. The main problem that arises is that the high concentration of
wealth in the hands of a small group of population causes a change in the social structure
and poses a danger to the democratic order. “When the rate of return on capital exceeds the
rate of growth of output and income, as it did in the Nineteenth Century and seems quite
likely  to  do  again  in  the  twenty-first,  capitalism  automatically  generates  arbitrary  and
unsustainable  inequalities  that  radically  undermine  the  meritocratic  values  on  which
democratic societies are based” (Piketty, 2014, p. 8).
Piketty was the first one who actually measured the impact, although scholars noted earlier
that an increasing share of capital income was only contributing to income inequality in
general  (see  Atkinson  &  Micklewright,  1992;  Mitra  &  Yemtsov,  2006;  Fiorentini  &
Montani, 2012).
Piketty  does  not  treat  inequality  as  necessarily  bad.  However,  he  admits  that  the  gap
between the rich and the poor should not exceed justifiable limits. Thus, Piketty argues, that
economic growth is far from the main engine of reducing income inequality. For example,
simple accounting for gross domestic product per capita does not reflect the changes in the
world demographic situation, which generally experiences population growth. Keeping the
rest of the variables constant, in fact, the economic growth of the countries going through a
demographic boom is “shrunk” by the growth of population, and at the same time, the role
of inherited wealth loses its importance; the final balance is hard to assess. 
In  Piketty's  view,  the  problem of  income inequality  cannot  be  treated  separately  from
politics and political decisions taken at a national level. That is why, he claims, the decrease
in inequality during “thirty glorious years” was a result of coping with the after-war shocks,
while  the  overall  increase  in  income inequality  was  dictated  primarily  by  the  shifts  in
taxation and other financial policies.
Milanovic's (1998) conclusions, made a dozen years before Piketty's research, comply with
later  evidence:  even  though  the  share  of  non-wage,  that  is  capital  income,  grew,  the
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following increase in inequality should be more associated with the general decrease in
social benefits and their poorly targeted distribution.
1.2.2. Worldwide increase in income inequality: other global factors
In the 21st Century, scholars became more concerned with income inequality in a global
context.  Italian researchers Riccardo Fiorentini and Guido Montani (2012) were among
those who noticed a rise in income inequality and connected it to the “second wave of
globalization”.  They  noted  that  the  increase  was  recorded  everywhere  in  the  world,
regardless the country's regime or its level of development (see also ILO, 2008). At the
same  time,  they  admitted  the  importance  of  national  policies  implemented  during  the
“thirty glorious years”, right after the end of the Second World War. They presumed that the
gap between the richest and the poorest households, primarily in 'old capitalist' regimes,
was kept at  a relatively low level due to the bigger concern of the general public and,
hence,  policymakers,  about  “fairness”  of  the  system,  including the  question  of  income
distribution.  The  gap  increased  when  more  liberal  policies,  like  the  ones  of  Margaret
Thatcher or Ronald Reagan, became dominant in the Western world.
Fiorentini  and Montani  also  assumed that  trade  globalization  involves  the  reduction  of
tariffs and other obstacles, making national economies and their labour force less protected.
Thus, income inequality is more likely to increase.
Openness  to  international  trade,  that  potentially  allows  bigger  flows  of  foreign  direct
investment,  was  considered  by  the  scholars  as  another  important  global  factor  that
contributes to inequality and has a controversial impact on a country's economy. On the one
hand,  foreign  direct  investment  actually  means  bringing  technology  to  less  developed
countries,  diffusion  of  know-how,  and,  therefore,  increases  a  country's  technological
advantages.  Implementation  of  new  technologies  facilitates  the  increase  of  the  skilled
labour wages in developed countries and unskilled labour in less developed countries, but
the  real  evidence,  according  to  the  authors,  is  rather  mixed.  In  the  studies  related  to
16
transition  economies,  though,  it  was  found  that  prioritising  foreign  investment  over
domestic one had greater negative effect (Bandelj & Mahutga, 2010).
1.2.3. Taxes and benefits: government as a social safety nets provider
Being correlated to  various  macroeconomic and demographic indicators,  distribution of
income in any country mainly depends on governmental policies, that are ideally supposed
not only to help the government collect taxes and maintain itself,  but also create social
safety nets and improve the well-being of its population by providing them with cash and in
kind benefits. Even though, in reality, the main focus of policymakers is still on economy
facilitation and improvement of economic performance, the governmental role in mitigating
unequal income distribution should not be underestimated (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). For
example, on a global level,  the distribution of income is more unequal than the one of
domestic  output,  meaning  that  the  governments  take  their  role  in  mitigating  the
consequences of market laws force (Piketty, 2014).
As already mentioned, even the researchers who paid the most attention to macroeconomic
indicators, found governmental policies as an influential instrument in combating income
inequality. Even a deterministic approach of Kuznets (1955) left room for the influence of
policies.
In order to fight the increasing concentration of wealth also caused by the growing share of
capital income, Piketty (2014) mainly proposes progressive taxation, along with preserving
economic  openness  and  avoiding  protectionism  as  the  ways  to  control  the  negative
outcomes of the capitalism. Openness, he added, was among the factors that helped Asian
countries to catch up fast with Western world in terms of economic development, not least
through the diffusion of knowledge and know-how. He admitted at the same time that most
likely  such  measures  will  be  –  and  are  already  –  opposed  by  nationally  oriented  and
protectionist  political  groups.  Thus,  in  practice the outcomes of such policies are  quite
likely to be less effective than they could have been in theory.
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Fiorentini  and  Montani  (2012)  admitted  the  limitations  of  macroeconomic  indicators
analysis as well: “It is difficult to separate the impact of trade globalization on inequality
from the effects of political and institutional reforms accompanying globalization, but the
suspicion  is  that  reforms  are  largely  responsible  for  the  recent  rise  in  inequality,  as
suggested by the different experiences of the 1960s-1970s and 1980s-2000s” (pp.98-99).
Those  scholars  who studied  the  impact  of  various  governmental  policies  on  inequality
underlined  the  importance  of  benefits  and  taxation  in  the  redistributive  role  of  the
government.
Evidence from OECD countries shows that taxes and benefits transfers reduce disposable
income inequality by about 25% as compared to market, or gross, ones (Pisu, 2012). Cash
transfers were found to play even bigger role, reducing about two thirds of inequality in
comparison with gross, or market, household income (Joumard et al., 2012). The effect,
though, might vary. In the case of OECD countries, some of them with a relatively poor
welfare system, like Australia, manage to mitigate market mechanisms to the same extent
as  the  countries  where  the  population  enjoys  a  more  generous  welfare  state  like  in
Germany.
With regard to benefits, the scholars found that governments that spend more money on
cash transfers normally “invest” more in the income redistribution within a life cycle, not
between  the  individuals,  meaning  that  the  amount  of  benefits  is  mostly  based  on
contributions and, thus, welfare is spent on pensioners. Other countries, which on average
spend less on cash transfers, have more targeted benefits. Scholars who studied transition
countries  also  assumed  that  pension  privatisation  should  result  in  a  less  redistributive
welfare state (Appel & Orenstein, 2018).
The redistributive effect of taxes does not vary greatly among OECD countries. Personal
income  ones  were  found  to  be  the  most  progressive.  Other  taxes,  like  social  security
contributions,  consumption  taxes  and  real  estate  taxes  have  mostly  regressive  nature.
Property taxes, even though being regressive, were not found to play a significant role.
Consumption taxes, on the contrary, make up a lion’s share of tax revenue, and their effect
is rather mixed: a decrease helps the poor to obtain the most necessary goods, at the same
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time they benefit the rich more, since these households consume a larger share of goods,
and, thus, contribute to unequal income distribution. In most countries taxation of capital
income,  wealth  and  inheritance  has  been  reduced,  which  negatively  influenced  the
redistributive  role  of  taxes,  but  was  justified  by  avoidance  of  “lock  in”  effect  and
encouragement of risk incentives and needed for investments and, thus, economic growth.
At the same time, there is an evidence that such a tax system benefits top managers in an
unjustifiable way.
Maria  Iosifidi  and  Nikolaos  Mylonidis  (2017)  also  draw  some  evidence  from  OECD
countries, assessing the impact of effective taxation on income inequality. They focused on
labour,  consumption,  and capital  rates,  analysing  their  ratios  as  well.  Along with  other
research findings, they proved a significant redistributive role of progressive labour income
taxation and a danger of high rates of consumption income, since hitting the poor would
only contribute to overall income inequality. The scholars also stressed that an increase in
capital income taxes in theory could play a great redistributive role, but in real world the
expected effects will not happen, since capital is easy to move abroad.
The authors also underlined that the tax rates give more insight on the real state of art when
the tax system rather than taxes separately are analysed. Nevertheless, the change of one tax
rate inevitably leads to redesign of another tax and, thus, the whole tax system. 
The scholars found out that the greater reliance on labour income taxes relative to capital
ones,  only  contributes  to  income inequality.  The same effect  has  a  greater  reliance  on
consumption taxes revenue as relative to capital income ones. At the same time, if labour
income taxes constitute a bigger share of tax revenue as compared to consumption ones,
income inequality is expected to improve.
Apart  from direct  government  intervention,  social  groups  can  also  help  improve  their
situation. With regard to labour income, that is wages, the Dutch sociologist Jelle Visser
and the  Italian economist  Daniele  Checchi  (2011) studied  the relation  between unions’
power expressed by their wage bargaining power and inequality in wages. The research was
based mostly on Western economies,  and it  was proven that  the decline in  unions was
positively correlated with income inequality (see also Blanchard et al., 2013). However, the
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causal relationship was not clear: either the loss of unions’ support resulted in larger wage
gap, or it was initial inequality that undermined the authority of unions. The study also
found that bargaining effect can potentially be substituted by another institutional variable –
minimum wage legislation.
1.2.4. More “equal” communist countries: local peculiarities and cautious assumptions
The Serbian-American economist Branko Milanovic (1998) claimed that in the 1990s two
revolutions happened: the Soviet bloc collapsed and the data on communist economies was
revealed  and  became  publicly  available.  However,  those  who  studied  the  income
inequalities in transition economies and especially those who made attempts to access the
pre-transition data, faced even more severe circumstances.
British scholars Anthony Atkinson and John Micklewright expanded the geographic and
ideological area of their  research to include former Communist countries. In their book
“Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Distribution of Income” (1992), they
tried to understand who gained and who lost during the transformation period, as well as to
answer  the  question  of  whether  population's  income  of  communist  countries  was,  as
officially claimed, more “equal” as opposed to capitalist  countries. They criticised their
colleagues for not paying attention for generous benefits in kind provided by Soviet led
governments, and generally concluded that Communist countries used to be more equal in
terms of income.
One of the reasons they saw in the fact that there was no real concentration of wealth even
in the richest households of nomenklatura, since luxury cars and apartments were provided
for the person on the means-tested basis and for a short period of time – usually lasting for
this  family member's  life.  However,  there is  still  indirect relation between the two: the
offspring of the same nomenklatura had higher chances to get an access to official positions
and, therefore, more generous and sought-after benefits. Yet, there was almost no chance to
accumulate savings.
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The  main  problem  faced  by  researchers  when  comparing  capitalist  and  communist
countries was the different methodology used by Western and Eastern statistical offices.
The surveys themselves varied in terms of not only a methodological basis that made the
between-countries comparison less precise, but also in terms of ideological bias: Central
European countries in this sense were recognised as more trust-worthy (see also Milanovic,
1998;  Flemming & Micklewright,  1999).  The structure  of  Czechoslovakian  survey,  for
instance, was similar and to some extent even better than the British “The New Earnings
Survey”  due  to  a  better  sample  representation  and  higher  response  rates  (Atkinson  &
Micklewright, 1992). The USSR data was considered the least reliable (McAuley, 1979).
However, generally all surveys conducted in communist countries suffered from another
particular form of ideological bias, namely the overrepresentation of 'productive sectors'
representatives in the sample (see also Milanovic, 1996; Flemming & Micklewright, 1999;
Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006).
It also should be noted, that, in case of communist and later in post-communist economies,
the surveys on consumption were generally preferred to the ones with questions about the
income per se:  since consumption reflects  the purchasing power of the households and
helps make approximations in terms of their real income, whilst in case of the surveys on
income per se there are psychological and sometimes even legal obstacles that prevent the
respondents from revealing the true state of art (Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006). For example, the
latter  reason is  applicable  in  cases  of  large  share  of  shadow economy or  low level  of
democracy and political freedom. Consumption surveys also succeed at least partially in
capturing 'hidden'  indicators such as return on shadow economy activities or the losses
resulting from wage arrears (Flemming & Micklewright, 1999). 
It is relatively hard and only to some extent reliable to use the surveys even from one
particular country, especially when tracing income inequality trends during transition times.
The methodology was changed over  the  years,  there  was no standard  followed,  so the
results  from  the  following  year  for  the  same  country  could  not  be  exact  and  precise
(Flemming & Micklewright, 1999). Scholars in principle agree that the nature of the data
was  changing  during  the  years,  so  even  the  most  trusted  sources  had  to  admit  that
21
“comparisons across countries and over time are very approximate” (World Bank, 1996,
p.67). Yet, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) found more equality in communist societies.
Not only population surveys created a methodological problem. In communist countries the
data on actual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was not available: 'gross material
output' was used instead, which did not take into account the production of services, neither
did it consider the production of the underground economy that was too big to be left aside
(Milanovic,  1998;  Svejnar,  2002).  Moreover,  such  statistics  were  influenced  by  the
ideology of fast and continuous growth, therefore it is a big risk to rely on the officially
produced figures (Milanovic,  1998).  Nevertheless,  some scholars found the evidence of
Kuznets' curve in action, for example, Aghion and Commander (1999), who studied the
data on Georgia of 1989 and 1996.
In contrast with manipulated GDP figures, the shadow economy, that is never recorded, nor
reported by any statistical agency for obvious reasons, was found to play a substantial role
in distribution of income. Troubled times of economic decline forced people to search for
solutions in the area of clandestine economic activities. Rosser et al.'s (2000) paper on the
shadow economy revealed the scale of the problem by measuring electricity consumption,
and the scholars found a positive correlation between the size of black market and income
inequality. Hence, they argue, preserving low income inequality prevents the population
from engaging in shadow economy activities. However, the causal relation between the two
phenomena is  unclear:  it  can be  dissatisfaction with the unfair  system that  pushes  one
towards  unofficial  and  unregistered  activities,  or  a  vast  field  of  unofficially  obtained
income might facilitate household inequality.  As concluded by the authors, “[g]iven the
social disorientation and alienation associated with the upheavals occurring in the transition
economies, we should not be surprised to observe large increases in income inequality,
collapses of tax revenues, and large increases in shares of the informal economy” (Rosser et
al., 2000, p.160).
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1.2.5. Varieties of capitalism in transition countries
The scholars who tried to investigate the effect of transition process as such on income
inequality trends in post-Communist countries ran into other problems as well. The biggest
issue being the one of differentiation between global processes such as fast technological
development (Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006), or rapid expansion of services and shrinkage of
heavy industries (Flemming & Micklewright, 1999), and transition processes as such that
were mostly related to the establishment of free market institutions and legal framework.
John Flemming and John Micklewright (1999) also paid separate attention to the latter,
noting that rapid changes were enhanced by the fact that transformation did not mean the
shift from central planned economy to market equilibrium immediately, and underlined the
importance of progressive taxation and generous governmental benefits.
Mitra and Yemtsov (2006), when analysing the impact of various factors that might have
affected the increase in income inequality in transition countries, underlined the importance
of public policies that were supposed to influence the situation, given that the rest of the
factors  mostly  connected  with  international  economic  processes,  influenced the  income
distribution in more or less the same way. According to the survey conducted by Zaidi
(2009), government intervention into the free market forces in order to mitigate its negative
consequences  was  even  expected  by  the  population  of  transition  countries.  If  in  the
beginning of transition various social “losses”, such as an “unfair” income distribution were
justified and considered as a price for liberalisation and transition, after some years the
population did not see the promised convergence with a more well-living Western World
(EBRD, 2013).
Scholars  studied  different  aspects  of  governmental  policies  that  might  have  negatively
influenced income inequality. All the transition governments decreased the amount of social
expenditures, and that was found as a factor contributing to income inequality (Ivanova,
2007). Another failure of transition countries governments was that, poorly handling the
targeting of social benefits, they failed to protect one of the most vulnerable groups – the
unemployed, not helping them to improve their situation and find a job (Mitra & Yemtsov,
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2006). In the end, that resulted in wide-spread long-term unemployment in post-communist
countries, that contributed to income inequality even more since the benefits were usually
paid for a limited period of time, and after a while the unemployed lost even this share of
income.  In  fact,  unemployment  became  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  for  transition
economies, since under the communist regime, first of all, the problem did not even exist –
parasitism,  on  the  contrary,  was  punished.  Secondly,  all  the  benefits  were  distributed
through  the  employers,  so  the  system  of  central  distribution  of  benefits  in  market
economies had to be deliberated to local municipalities, thus, such institutions had to be
created from scratch (Flemming & Micklewright, 1999).
After abandoning communism in favour of victorious capitalism, the countries with rich
communist legacies faced the question of which way to adopt. Advanced economies by that
time had already had well established institutions and “rules of the game”. Jeffrey Sachs
(1990),  for  example,  believed  that  since  Eastern  European  economies  did  not  have
established institutions, for them following either British or Swedish model was identical
and did not matter.
According to seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001), the capitalist systems lie in the
range between liberal and coordinated market economies (LME and CME respectively).
The main difference between these two ideal types is in the ways of coordination between
firms and other actors. For LME, market mechanisms play a greater role, whilst for CMEs,
non-market forms of cooperation are built upon.
This model explains not only the peculiarities of firms' interactions, but also the differences
in institutional design that help maintain these relations. In brief, LMEs provide a more
fruitful environment for implementing new and risky, high-tech ideas. However, in these
systems, people with a creative approach and innovative thinking benefit the most. LMEs
are also characterized by friendlier investment environment and, therefore, modest taxes,
but as a consequence, weaker welfare state. CMEs, on the contrary, are more open for wage
bargaining and other kinds of negotiations, but the price that is paid for it is in high taxes
and slower diffusion of technologies.
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These concepts were created on the basis of evidence from advanced capitalist countries.
Inter-firms relations, institutions in communist regimes, and, obviously, the consequences
of their  collapse were not taken into account.  Scholars usually  admit  that  implying the
existing dichotomy of liberal and coordinated market economies is no longer possible in
post-communist  world.  Yet,  the  approximation  is  possible,  and  Estonia  in  academic
findings  usually  represents  the  typical  LME,  while  Slovenia  resembles  CME the  most
(Feldmann, 2006).
Nölke  and  Vliegenthart  (2009)  distinguished  a  separate  type  called  'dependent  market
economies',  that  they  labelled  to  the  Visegrad  countries  –  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. This approach is valid up to the point when the other countries in
transition have to be classified.
Other scholars tend to distinguish separate groups within the region, that remind of the
classical Hall and Soskice approach only to some extent. Further assessment of institutional
design in new capitalist countries was conducted by Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits
(2012), who introduced one of the most explicit criticisms towards the traditional variety of
the capitalist system, arguing that, first, evidence from advanced capitalist economies is too
different  from the  historical  path  of  Central  and  Eastern  European countries  (CEECs).
Secondly,  they  argue  that  countries  in  transition  faced  global  challenges  before  they
managed to finish building up capitalist institutions, which in turn influenced their design.
So,  the  process  was  characterized  by  a  'double-movement  dynamics':  democracy
implementation and democratic transformation.
In response, Bohle and Greskovits introduce their own matrix that helped to fit the new
capitalist countries of Central and Eastern Europe into four distinctive groups. As a basis,
they  used  Karl  Polanyi's  approach  (1944),  who  outlined  three  dimensions  that  shaped
distinctive  capitalist  models:  government  (accountability  vs.  state  capture),  market
(efficiency vs. commodification),  and welfare state (protection vs. pauperisation). Bohle
and  Greskovits  added  three  more  dimensions,  that,  in  their  view,  are  crucial  for  the
differentiation  of  distinctive  types  of  emerged  capitalist  economies:  democracy
(representation  vs.  ungovernability),  corporatism  (interest  mediation  vs.  rent-seeking),
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macroeconomic coordination (stability vs. straightjacket on development). Thus, four new
groups of capitalist countries situated in Central and Eastern Europe emerged: neoliberal,
embedded neoliberal, neocorporatist regimes, and nonregime.
The Baltic States were labelled as neoliberal, while the Visegrad countries, that includes
Czech and Slovak Republics, were identified as embedded neoliberal ones. Both of the
regimes are characterized by strong market and governmental mechanisms. 
The  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics,  as  the  elements  of  embedded  neoliberal  regime,
implemented a more inclusive strategy in social and political terms. Their welfare state is
considered  to  be  relatively  generous.  Searching  for  a  balance  between  market
transformation and social cohesion is the most distinctive feature of embedded neoliberal
regime. However, the authors note that within time their institutions proved to be volatile,
unstable, and 'atrophied'.
The Baltic States, three countries that constitute the neoliberal regime, are characterized by
rapid  adaptation  of  democratic  and  market  economy institutions,  but  actually  failed  to
mitigate the social consequences of transition and to provide social safety nets. Moreover,
the democratic elements of Estonia and Latvia in particular are undermined by deprivation
of political rights from a substantial part of population, while in Lithuania their political
participation is also limited. The least established institution in the Baltic States compared
to other CEECs is social partnership.
Despite  existing  social  and  political  problems,  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  success  in
transition  to  capitalist  world  is  generally  accepted.  However,  which  institutional
foundations improved or restricted their performance, is not clear yet. Neither it is obvious
which elements of institutions design influenced income inequality the most.
Although, Grimalda et al. (2010) claimed that both groups of countries – the Czech and
Slovak Republics and the Baltic States – managed to mitigate negative consequences of
transformation in terms of income inequality rather well as compared to other states that
went  through  the  same  process,  due  to  their  better  developed  institutions  and  higher
financial resources at their disposal.
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1.2.6. Mass privatisation: a unique experience of transition countries
In the case of transition economies, not only taxation and the distribution of benefits via
social  cash transfers  should be  treated  as  a  governmental  intervention.  Moving from a
central  planned  to  market  economy  required  one  very  important  and  inevitable  step:
distribution of national property among private individuals. 
Jan Svejnar (2002), a Czech-born American economist, pointed out two different type of
reforms that the countries in transition had to implement. Type I, “quick” reforms were
related to elimination of old institution and implementing the essential features of market
economy like price liberalisation, privatisation of small enterprises, with partial provision
of social safety nets. Type II reforms more time and were associated with ensuring the
functions of new institutions, the creation of a legal framework, privatisation of medium
and big enterprises and establishing more extensive social safety nets. As Svejnar argued,
type I reforms were implemented quickly and followed relatively the same patterns across
transition countries, while type II reforms were conducted in various ways, and the success
depended largely on the historical institutional legacies and resulted in the outcomes that
were different from case to case.
Privatization policies generally were found to negatively affect income inequality, at least
in the short run (Birdsall & Nellis, 2003). During communist times, private wealth was
close to zero. When the transition started, according to approximate – since based on not so
much reliable data – estimates of Piketty (2014), already in the 2000s capital income was
four  times  higher  than  a  national  one,  which  is  close  to  the  performance  of  Western
countries.  Thus,  an  unequal  distribution  of  assets  had  nothing  to  do  with  economic
development, it was a result of governmental policies.
Sara  Rose  and  Crina  Viju  (2014)  analysed  a  number  of  macroeconomic  and  political
processes that took place during the first years of transition, and generally concluded that
too many factors could have influenced income inequality during that time, which makes it
difficult  to come up with some stylised facts.  For example,  they tested the relationship
between  the  degree  of  political  rights  and  income inequality,  and  did  not  find  a  clear
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answer, even though some of the research previously found a strong negative correlation
between the two (Sylwester, 2002). Corruption as a “cultural” feature of most of the post-
communist countries, was also taken into account, but does not seem to have had an effect
on income inequality, according to the study.
Privatisation, on the contrary, was the one indicator that was found to have a significant
impact  on income inequality  (see also Bandelj&Mahutga,  2010).  Although,  small  scale
privatisation was found to be rather insignificant (Grimalda et al., 2010).
Grimalda et al. (2010) in their research also controlled for a price liberalisation outcomes,
and found their  effect  on income inequality  strongly significant.  However,  the scholars
noted that  price liberalisation,  even though taking various  forms, affected the countries
income distribution in rather similar way.
Due  to  the  complexity  of  the  process  that  can  be  described  in  both  quantitative  and
qualitative terms, the scholars,  instead of generalisation,  suggested to look at  particular
countries and particular period of times in order to get a clearer picture.
1.3. Importance and implications of income inequality studies
The idea of mitigating income inequality was more pronounced, for obvious reasons, in
Communist countries. It was an inevitable part of ideology that promised an equal and fair
society. However, there was a deeper reason to prevent the wealth accumulation. First, it
would be – and actually was – used by privileged parts of the society like nomenlkatura for
personal consumption of better quality and rarer goods and services, but that was not the
main threat. Accumulation of wealth could lead to the attempt to obtain the ownership of
the production means and establishment of private property in the form of a big enterprise,
which was against the basic idea of central planned economy. Another threat lay in wealth
as a source of freedom and independence from political obedience (Milanovic, 1998).
In the era of capitalism, income inequality lost its position as a sensitive indicator, and
some Western researchers were blaming their colleagues for mistreating the problem and
labelling it as too socialist and irrelevant (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1992). According to
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Fiorentini and Montani (2012, p. 80), “[f]rom the point of view of economic theory, it is
worth  noting  that,  unlike  classical  economic  thought,  standard  neoclassical  economic
theory treats income distribution as a relatively minor issue”. International organisations
though continuously produce reports even in the era of economic liberalism, noting that
“redistribution through income taxes and cash benefits does not necessarily harm growth”
(OECD, 2015, p.60). On the contrary, even from a liberal perspective, thoroughly designed
economic institutions contribute to economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
However, even in the context of capitalist countries, including 'young' ones, high income
inequality poses a danger to political freedom and democracy, as noted by Fiorentini and
Montani (2012). The authors explain that apart from the fact that fair distribution of income
should be treated as a necessary democratic right that secures liberty and democracy, if the
gap between household incomes is too big, given the growing costs of electoral campaigns,
the society will inevitably become misrepresented in parliament and other bodies, since the
poorest ones would have almost no chances to participate in political rallies and intervene
in  the  decision  making  process.  At  the  same  time,  the  existence  of  extremely,
disproportionally wealthy group of people creates a danger of excessive and relatively easy
lobbying of the big companies' interests, that usually do not coincide with the so called
general public interest.
From a purely humanitarian perspective, an increase in income inequality, especially an
unexpectedly rapid and significant one in case of transition countries, could become an
unbearable  burden  for  the  least  protected  groups  of  people.  That  is  why  international
organizations  such  as  IMF,  World  bank,  OECD advised  the  governments  dealing  with
transition  period,  first  of  all,  to  establish  a  solid  secure  social  safety  net  (Atkinson &
Micklewright, 1992).
Mostly scholars – and policymakers – in modern capitalist countries prefer to address the
problem of income inequality in relation to poverty (for example,  see Milanovic, 1998;
Heshmati, 2004; Alam et al., 2005; Cornia, 2005). Undoubtedly, this section of research
should not be underestimated since it draws attention to the problems of those who are the
least protected, and the consequences of the phenomenon in terms of population health or
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criminal rates (for example, refer to Patterson, 1991; Kawachi & Kennedy, 1999; Wen et
al., 2003; Ram, 2005).
Less attention was paid to the fact that the problem of income inequality, whose importance
was always undermined by liberal  ideology proponents,  is  actually  a  problem of  well-
functioning free market economy. More fair distribution of household incomes is a healing
tool even for the most liberal  economic regimes, and it is also beneficial  for economic
growth in a long-term period (Berg & Ostry, 2011).
The main threat created by large differences in individual and household incomes is the
erosion  of  the  middle  class,  that  is  always  the  basis  of  a  healthy  economy.  Such  a
polarisation of the society – “consumers” in this case – gives huge advantage to the richest
and  deprives  those  who  earn  little  from  participation  in  trade,  hence,  depressing  the
aggregate demand and leading further to economy stagnation (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012).
Keeping income inequality at lower levels also allegedly prevents shadow economy from
flourishing, as discussed above.
Additionally, scholars argued that large income inequality is extremely dangerous for the
accumulation of human capital. Low-income households in these situations do not have an
opportunity to invest in education, that, in turn, not only deprives them from improving
their income situation, but also does not contribute to the country's human capital size in
general terms (OECD, 2015, p. 60). Another side effect of the sharp increase in income
inequality is related to social trust: the feeling of injustice undermines confidence, trust in
the government, and social solidarity (Johnson et al., 1997). There is also an alternative
argument  that,  however,  was  not  supported  by  the  real  evidence  due  to  measurement
problems:  a  large  tax  burden together  with low trust  in  the  government  and,  thus,  the
perception  of  the  welfare  system  as  unjustified,  increases  the  number  of  people  who
voluntary choose to get engaged in informal labour activities (Schneider & Enste, 1998).
With regard to global, or horizontal, income inequality, in his later work, Milanovic (2013)
highlighted a new challenge brought by globalisation – growing migration flows from poor
to rich countries.  Noting that  the process itself  from economical perspectives is  mostly
motivated by market rules, Milanovic is concerned with the fact that it causes speculation
30
and new issues in the world of “real politics”.  Rephrasing Marx, nowadays there is  an
evidence of the clash not between classes, but between citizenships.
1.4. Summary of scholars’ findings
The first problem of income inequality studies lies in the fact that the gap between the rich
and the poor is relatively hard to measure. The most widely used and available indicator
nowadays is the Gini coefficient, that expresses the distance of the income distribution from
“perfect” equality  together with decile  ratios comparison that gives more insight  to the
patterns of income distribution between the groups. Other indexes, like Atkinson’s, Hoover,
Theil’s, have more advantages in terms of decomposition of income inequality, but they
require greater data collection and are not so easy to interpret.
In  the  case  of  communist  countries,  it  was  even  harder  to  make  estimations,  due  to
manipulated data  on the one hand, and generous benefits-in-kind on the other.  Thus,  it
becomes hard to compare the situation not only between the countries, but also within a
particular one over time. Later on transition countries raised other challenges – to measure
income inequality  and mitigate  the effect  of shadow economy,  wage arrears,  and other
unobserved factors.
The main problem that scholars face when studying income inequality is the large number
of processes – political, economical, social – that happen simultaneously on both levels –
global and national – and each of them might contribute to the increase of the gap between
the rich and the poor. Moreover, there is almost no agreement between the scholars what
contributes the most and in which way, because the empirical evidence is rather diversified.
Only some evidence is clear and undoubted – income inequality is rising everywhere in the
world, and the main redistributive role is played by national governments.
Economic growth used to be one of the most important explanations of income inequality
distribution. Over time, the approach was challenged, and sometimes contradictory findings
were made. Urbanisation was also listed among the main causes of income inequality rise,
and the supporting evidence is quite rich, but yet there is research that did not prove the
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assumed correlation. Trade globalisation leads to the greater exposure of labour force to
market economy mechanisms and implies greater flows of foreign direct investments, but
the final outcomes vary greatly due to different influences on particular groups of workers.
The workers ability to negotiate their wage through various means was also studied, and the
evidence showed clear correlation between strong wage bargaining power and relatively
low level of income inequality.
Some scholars tried to explain the difference in income inequality levels between countries
by the varieties of capitalism they adopted. However, first, it was found that the institutions
created in the beginning of transition process had been changed over time. Second, the
evidence of OECD countries proved that countries can handle income distribution in rather
similar ways, representing different types of capitalism and welfare systems.
The rising share of capital was also found to contribute to the income of a limited and
rather small  group of people. Corporate taxes cuts and increasing burden of labour and
consumption  tax  payers  only  worsen  the  situation.  Progressive  taxation,  especially  on
capital income, might be a good solution to shrink the gap between the rich and the poor,
but most likely it would be viewed negatively by political the elite and entrepreneurs. Thus,
scholars suggest paying attention to tax ratios in the total revenue, not their absolute values
or legally imposed rates.
Other policies that were found to have a great redistributive effect were welfare policies, or
redistribution of benefits. The evidence proves that generous cash benefits can contribute to
mitigating  income  inequality  to  the  same  extent  as  not  so  generous  but  well  targeted
benefits. A unique case of transition countries also proved that the privatisation policies that
helped redistribute the wealth contributed to income inequality to a great extent.
None of the researchers treated income inequality as social evil. The depth of the gap is the
main  concern.  Benefiting  the  income  of  only  a  limited  group  of  people,  apart  from
humanitarian  concerns,  can  undermine  the  main  democratic  principles,  including  the
underrepresentation of low-income households. Inadequate treatment not only of the poor
but also of the middle class suppresses demand and leads to crises. High income inequality
slows  down  accumulation  of  human  capital.  Moreover,  it  leads  to  large  migration
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movements  from  low-income  countries  to  high-income  ones.  To  summarise,  unequal
income distribution creates a number of not only economical but also political problems
that the establishment has to deal with.
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Chapter Two. Theoretical framework and methodology of the study
This chapter gives insights on methodological aspects of the study. First, the explanation of
the chosen variables is given. Second, the research design is described. It is followed by
conceptualisation  and  operationalisation  section.  Additional  focus  is  made  on  the
methodology of other scholars’ research, where they tried to estimate income inequality in
former communist countries, especially during the first years of transition, when national
statistics was diverse and hard to compare. The section is concluded by the list of indexes
and database sources used in the study.
2.1. Theoretical framework of the research
Scholars have approached previous empirical and theoretical analysis on income inequality
in different ways. When conducting the studies, researchers concentrated on observing both
macroeconomic and demographic factors and national policies.
Following mostly the results of the studies focused on transition economies, in this work,
we concentrate  on  the  factors  that  had  significant  and  rather  diverse  effect  on  income
inequality  in  each  particular  country.  Therefore,  controlling  for  macroeconomic  and
demographic indicators, the main focus is on governmental policies.
Macroeconomic and demographic indicators of the study include urbanisation level and
capital/income ratio, mostly following Piketty’s (2014) approach.
Economic growth, being widely discussed, in this study is disregarded due to controversial
scholarly  findings  (Bruno et  al.,  1998).  Neither  foreign  direct  investment  is  taken into
account, because its effects were found to be rather mixed, complex, and targeted to some
particular income groups (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012).
The shadow economy, even though considered an important factor contributing to income
inequality especially in the context of transition countries (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1992;
Rosser et al., 2000), is still too hard to capture and, therefore, cannot be used to produce
reliable results, at least unless a better proxy is found.
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Governmental policies were generally assumed to play a great role in income inequality
mitigation (Fiorentini & Montani, 2012; Piketty,  2014, etc.).  The most important policy
fields that were found to affect income distribution significantly are the benefits distribution
and taxation  (Joumard et  al.,  2012),  as  well  as  privatisation (Rose & Viju,  2014),  that
happened to a larger extent during the first  years of economic liberalisation.  Moreover,
these policies, according to Svejnar (2002), represented the type II reforms and were found
to have various effects across the countries.
With  regard  to  benefits  distribution,  due  to  a  complexity  of  the  system,  we  focus  on
generosity  of  cash  benefits  expenditures  and  prevailing  type  of  welfare  policies  –
universalistic or means-tested, to control for the degree of targeting benefits, as argued by
Joumard et al. (2012).
Taxation  policies  are  also  included  in  the  research  framework,  following  Iosifidi  and
Mylonidis’s approach (2017), the design of tax system, as well as the shares of labour,
consumption, and capital income along with their ratios.
Unions bargaining power that was found to have a negative effect on income inequality,
according to Visser and Checchi’s (2011) findings, is also taken into account.
Considering these previous studies, the matrix of varieties of capitalism adjusted for the
context of CEE countries looks like an appealing framework for the research: classification
has  solid  theoretical  and  practical  justifications  and  provides  with  six  comparative
dimensions of institutions. However, the neoliberal group that consists of the Baltic States
is homogeneous in terms of the income gap, whilst within the embedded neoliberal group,
Czech Republic and Slovakia perform differently from Poland and Hungary.  Therefore,
varieties of capitalism approach, at least in case of the countries of interest, only partially
explains the difference in income inequality performance – the implemented version of
capitalism to some extent imply the limitations of possible taxation and benefits distribution
policies, although the institutions also develop and change within the time.
Price liberalisation, even though being a significant and outstanding process that transition
countries went through, is also disregarded due to its homogeneous effect on the countries
(Grimalda et al., 2010).
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2.2. Research design
Thus, this research represents a small-N comparative analysis of five countries divided into
two groups – the Czech and Slovak Republic as the most successful with fighting income
inequality  and  the  Baltic  States  that  include  Estonia,  Latvia,  and Lithuania  as  the  EU
outsiders.
The study applies  Most  Similar  Systems Design (MSSD) research.  Both groups of  the
countries have a communist past, even though only the Baltic States were the part of Soviet
Union, while Czechoslovakia remained relatively independent. However, a brief historical
overview  of  pre-transition  conditions  is  provided  in  the  following  chapters  to  analyse
similarities and differences in communist legacies.
The research is mostly concentrated on the effects on income inequality caused by public
policies, such as privatization, taxation and benefits distribution. At the same time, some of
the macroeconomic and demographic indicators proposed by political economists, namely
the level of urbanisation and the share of labour and capital income are kept as control
variables.  The  study  also  takes  into  account  wage  bargaining  power,  even  though  it
potentially can influence only labour income share of distribution.
Thus, in this work, considering the existing literature, we seek to prove that public policies
played the key role in the redistribution of income in case of transition economies while
controlling for macroeconomic and demographic factors. Thus, we expect to observe that:
1) in more urbanised countries, higher income inequality is observed;
2) a larger share of capital income is associated with higher levels of income
inequality;
3) powerful workers unions mitigate the effect of market forces on wages;
4)  a  gradual  approach  to  privatisation  resulted  in  a  more  modest  income
inequality rise;
5) emphasis on targeted welfare policies along with generosity of welfare state
keeps income inequality at a moderate level;
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6)  greater  reliance  on  labour  and  consumption  rather  than  capital  taxes
contributes to suppressing income inequality.
If the effect of macroeconomic and demographic factors can be immediately noticed, in
order to properly access the influence of governmental policies on income inequality, their
effects will be considered with a one-two years lag. Moreover, we expect that reforms have
a restructuring nature and, thus, their potential influence, if any, is supposed to be of a
bigger magnitude and for the longer term.
Generally the study covers the period of the beginning of transition in 1985 up to 2014,
which marks the ten-years anniversary of the countries of study in the European Union.
2.3. Conceptualisation and operationalisation
Income inequality,  the main subject  of the study, is  considered as the gap between the
richest and the poorest shares of the population. The definition of income that serves the
research aim is derived from OECD approach: “Income is defined as household disposable
income in a particular year. It consists of earnings, self-employment and capital income and
public cash transfers; income taxes and social security contributions paid by households are
deducted” (OECD, 2018). Equalised household income per capita, or later on referred as a
household  income,  if  not  specified,  signifies  that  not  only  the  number  of  household
members was taken into account, but also the final figure was adjusted to the needs of each
family member, meaning, for example, that children and elderly consume less than adults.
Additionally, in order to observe the skew of income distribution line, the comparison of
deciles is used.
The level of urbanisation is understood as a proportion of the population living in urban
areas. Therefore, the country is considered to be more urbanised if a smaller percentage of
population lives in rural areas.
The division of capital and labour income is represented by a ratio of capital returns and
wages, that can be measured by the means of adjusted wage share, or the share of wages in
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total national income.
Bargaining  power  of  workers,  which  is  usually  also  referred  as  power  of  unions,  is
relatively  hard  to  capture,  since  the  phenomenon  is  complex  and  multidimensional,
combining lots of quantitative and qualitative indicators. In order to capture the trends, two
parameters are taken into account: union density rate, which indicates the size of union
membership, and bargaining coverage rate, which measures how many employees enjoy
bargaining agreements.
Privatisation in this study is measured in both quantitative and qualitative ways. In order to
observe the speed and degree of the privatisation, the share of private sector expressed as a
percentage of GDP for the first decade of market economy, since mass privatisation was
finished by the end of 1990s, is used to capture the expansion of the private sector. At the
same  time,  the  privatisation  types  are  reviewed  and  expressed  as  categorical  nominal
variables.
Taxation policies in this research include effective labour, consumption, and capital taxes
share  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  Labour/capital,  consumption/capital,  and
labour/consumption tax ratios are computed and compared in order to assess the degree of
governmental reliance on particular type of taxes, taken by their economic function. Tax
rates and their main changes within the time of study are reviewed as well.
Benefits distribution is also represented as both a discrete variable – the amount of benefits
in  cash as  a  percentage of  GDP to make a  better  between-country comparison,  and an
ordinal  variable,  indicating  which  welfare  policies  –  means-tested  or  universalistic  –
constitute the larger share. The GDP growth is also taken into account in order to control
the dynamics of cash transfers in nominal values.
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2.4. Indexes and databases
2.4.1. Differences in methodologies of different Gini coefficients calculations
Income inequality in this  study is measured by Gini coefficient.  In this particular case,
when the variable of interest is the gap between the rich and the poor, its pitfalls such as
potential bias towards some parts of the income distribution groups and poor representation
of  the  situation  with  poverty,  discussed  in  the  Chapter  One,  can  be  disregarded.  The
universality  and comparability  of  Gini  coefficient  (Rosser  et  al.,  2000),  that  takes  into
account not only labour and capital incomes, but benefits received and taxes paid, suits this
research design the most. For the years 2005-2014, the information on Gini coefficient is
available  in  the  Eurostat  database,  and  their  conceptualisation  of  income  fits  the
methodological framework of this research.
There is a problem of missing data for the previous years, from 1985 to 2004, thus, the
information  needs  to  be  derived  from  various  sources.  The  following  paragraphs  are
dedicated to the problem of different estimations of Gini coefficients in the countries of
study.
The problem of dissimilar calculations of Gini coefficients is mostly inherent in the first
years  of  transition:  as  already  discussed  in  Chapter  One,  scholars  admit  that  under
communist  rule  the  data  was  highly  likely  to  be  manipulated  (see  Atkinson  &
Micklewright, 1992), while during the first years of independence solid methodology and
generally relevant institutions for statistics were simply missing (Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006).
Therefore, the only way left for the scholars was to review the existing data from family
budget surveys and assess it with caution, admitting all the existing limitations.
British  scholars  Anthony  Atkinson  and  John  Micklewright  (1992)  assessed  income
inequality in the countries of interest only for some particular years: 1985 and 1988 for
Czech and Slovak Republics, and 1989 for the Baltic States. The limitations the authors
admitted was the fact that Czech and Slovak surveys were based on the monetary, or net,
income, excluding the benefits provided in kind, which goes along with the concept of a
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household income used in  this  research.  Also,  before 1993,  the  household  income was
approximately calculated on the basis of personal income reports. As for the Baltic States,
due to a biased representation of the sample, their estimations mostly reflect the situation in
the families of workers  and collective farm workers.  Atkinson and Micklewright  relied
mostly  on  the  data  on  consumption,  because  treating  the  surveys  this  way  helped  to
improve  the  problem  of  under-reporting  income.  However,  the  final  estimations  are
supposed to capture a household disposable income per capita.
The Italian scholar Giovanni Cornia (1994) provided his estimations for the first years of
capitalism for the Czech Republic (1989-1993) and Slovakia (1989-1992). He based his
calculations  on  the  same household  surveys  as  Atkinson and Micklewright  (1992)  did,
assuming  the  Czechoslovak  data  to  be  reliable.  However,  Cornia  noticed  that  the
households at  the ends of distribution,  meaning the richest  and the poorest  deciles,  are
under-represented in the surveys. Therefore, the hidden bias in his estimations lies towards
income distribution among middle-income households and, thus, mostly reflect the changes
between  and  within  that  groups.  As  well  as  in  Atkinson  and  Micklewright’s  research,
Cornia  tried  to  assess  disposable  household  income per  capita,  basing  his  calculations
mostly  on  consumption  in  order  to  prevent  income  under-reporting  problems  and  to
partially estimate the benefits in kind.
Branko  Milanovic  (1998)  assessed  income  inequality  in  Czech  Republic  (year  1988),
Slovakia (years 1988 and 1993), and Estonia (1995). Unlike other scholars, he noticed that
Czech  and  Slovak  data  derived  from  the  household  surveys  is  less  reliable  than  was
previously assumed. In the case of the Czech Republic, he found that income inequality
seemed to be overestimated, because the time period of the surveys was relatively short.
Slovak data excluded form the surveys the households with economically active members
but headed by pensioners, and the direction of possible bias, in his opinion, was hard to
assess. Along with other scholars, Milanovic considered the problems with the Estonian
dataset rather severe due to the sample over-representation problems, discussed above. He
followed more or less the same methodology as Atkinson and Micklewright and Cornia:
40
when estimating a disposable household income per capita, benefits in kind were partially
taken into account.
The World Bank economists Pradeep Mitra and Ruslan Yemtsov (2006), being concerned
with a possible effect of shadow economy on real figures of income distribution, in their
estimations,  used  the  data  on household  consumption  adjusted  per  capita.  Other  World
Bank  economists  Francisco  Ferreira  and  Martin  Ravallion  (2008)  focused  more  on
capturing the welfare distribution situation and, thus, also analysed household consumption.
Therefore, the results of the World Bank researchers are likely to be quite different from the
ones of other scholars, who tried to estimate a household disposable income, but should be
more accurate in capturing the well-being of population. At the same time, they should be
more sensitive in terms of capturing the effect of indirect taxation on income distribution.
Transformative  Monitoring  for  Enhanced  Equity  (Transmonee)  database,  a  project  of
UNICEF, was aimed to assess the situation with poverty, mostly with regard of children and
women’s well-being. The researchers collected and analysed the data on household income
per capita reported through surveys for all the five countries of this study, using secondary
sources only for the first years of observation. The situation in Czech Republic is covered
from 1989 to 2009, in Slovakia – from 1996 to 2008. The data on Estonia is covered from
1989 to 2005, on Latvia and Lithuania – from 1989 to 2004, with significant breaks in
time-series data.
Eurostat  and OECD databases  both  provide the  information on a  household  disposable
income adjusted to the household size. They cover all the countries, starting from 2003-
2004 and, therefore, provide a good source for cross-country comparison, as well as for
careful and standardized assessment of the changes of income inequality situation within a
particular country.
The  World  Bank  data  on  Gini  coefficients  is  disregarded  in  this  research  due  to  its
methodology:  indicators  take into account  gross,  not  net,  household income per  capita.
Therefore, the redistributive role of the government is not reflected in this case.
With regard to the Czech and Slovak Republics comparisons, it must be noted also that a
number of researchers reported difficulties in separating the data for Czech and Slovak
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lands  from overall  the  Czechoslovak  database.  That  is  why  some  of  the  datasets  (for
example, see Deininger & Squire, 2013) prefer to drop the observations due to their rather
limited reliability. 
For the sake of  summary and better  comparability  within and across  the countries,  the
weighted score, that is based also on the findings of the above mentioned scholars along
with other indicators and pure statistical estimations for the years of missing data, is mostly
used in this research, provided by Frederick Solt’s project The Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID) (2013). The dataset has its limitations, because it generates a
universalised Gini coefficient based on the research that uses different methodologies. The
estimations of the Gini coefficient that vary greatly for the same year and the same country
are studied closer and possible explanations of the differences are presented. For the period
of 2005-2014 the Eurostat database is used a primary source.
The data on decile ratios, that is a complimentary source representing the skew of income
inequality  line,  is  derived  from  the  Eurostat  database  (EU-SILC  survey),  since  the
calculations are made on the basis of net household income per capita. The World Bank
database  has  a  wider  coverage,  but  the  calculations  are  made  on  the  basis  of  gross
household income, therefore, it does not satisfy the conceptualisation of this study.
The Eurostat  database does not provide the information on the share of income for the
middle  deciles,  using  quartiles  instead.  For  the  sake  of  calculations,  quartile  3  (Q3) is
divided by two in order to represent approximately the figures for D5. Even though such an
approximation is not truly correct, it can be used for the comparison since the same number
is used to calculate decile ratios. The information is available for the countries of study for
the period of 2005-2014, with a sole exception for Estonia, where the data is available from
2004.
2.4.2. Other indicators databases
The level of urbanisation in this study is presented as a percentage of urban population of
total, and the World Bank database is used for that. The data is available for the period of
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the years 1991-2014.
The ratio of labour and income capital is represented in a form of adjusted wage share as a
percentage of total  income, since it  includes not only wages of employees but also the
income derived from self-employment activities. The data used in the research is provided
by  Annual macro-economic database of the European Commission's Directorate General
for Economic and Financial Affairs (AMECO), and is available for the period of 1993-
2014, with the exception of Slovakia – from 1995 to 2014.
Bargaining power indicators are derived from the Data Base on Institutional Characteristics
of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2014 (ICTWSS)
(Visser, 2015). The first variable is called a “union density rate” expressed as a “net union
membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment”. The bargaining
agreements are measured with an “adjusted bargaining (or union) coverage rate”, calculated
as “employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all
wage  and  salary  earners  in  employment  with  the  right  to  bargaining,  expressed  as
percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from
the right to bargain”.  The data on the countries is rather incomplete though. The union
density rate information for the Czech and Slovak Republics covers the years of 1993-2013,
for Estonia – the period of 1992-2012, Latvia and Lithuania – 1995-2012. The data on the
Baltic states suffers from significant breaks in time-series. Adjusted bargaining coverage
rate data for most of the countries covers the years of 2001-2013 with breaks in time-series.
Full data from 1990 to 2013 is only available for the Czech Republic.
The data on the speed of privatisation expressed as a share of GDP covers the years of
1991-1999 and is derived from the “Transition report 2000” prepared by European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2000).
Information on taxes shares is taken from Eurostat database. For most of the countries, the
data is available from 1995 to 2014, with the exception of Slovakia, where such statistics
were being collected from 1999, and Lithuania, where the data covers the period of 2000-
2014.
The data on cash benefits expenditures of the countries as a percentage of their GDP is
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available from 1995 to 2014 in OECD database. The same source is used for extracting the
data  on GDP rate,  measured  in  billion dollars  at  current  prices  and current  purchasing
power parity (PPPs). The type of welfare state policies is obtained from V-dem database,
the indicator being called as “means-tested vs. universalistic welfare policies” and taking
values  from 0 to  5,  where  0  represents  the  situation  when all  the  welfare  policies  are
targeted to particular groups of population and are represented only in cash benefits. The
score  of  5,  on  the  contrary,  signifies  that  all  the  governmental  welfare  policies  can
potentially benefit every member of society and a targeted benefits approach does not exist.
These indicators are used to measure the variables of interest in the following chapters.
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Chapter Three. Trends in income inequality and macroeconomic conditions: analysis
of the indicators
This chapter is dedicated to the observation of the trends experienced by the countries of
study. As discussed in Chapter Two, income inequality is expressed in Gini coefficient and
decile ratios, their analysis is provided. In this chapter, the changes of urbanisation level
and the share of labour income are also compared to the income distribution trends.
3.1.  Income  inequality:  skyrocketing  during  transition  and  stabilising  at  different
levels
The data on income inequality during early years of transition is not standardised and is
available  only for some particular years,  as discussed in Chapter  Two. The figures 1-5
reflect the differences in assessment of income inequality provided by different sources,
including manual calculations that were done by the researches who dealt with analysis of
income inequality in former communist countries.
3.1.1. Income inequality trends in the Czech Republic
As shown on the Figure 1, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) assessed Gini coefficient in
the Czech Republic under the communist rule in more or less the same way as SWIID
(2013).
Starting from 1988, the scientific estimations of Gini coefficient varied to some extent.
The year of 1989, at the end of which the Velvet revolution took place, was assessed by
researchers  slightly  differently.  SWIID combined  a  couple  of  indicators  based  only  on
disposable income per capita and estimated the Gini as 20.8%, while Cornia (1994) gave
the country a better score – 18.5%. He also found a rise in the Gini coefficient by 1.6% in
1990, while SWIID reported a slight decrease of 0.3% for the same year. At the same time,
the  indicators  for  1990 reported  by different  sources  are  close  to  each other  –  around
45
20.3%. Transmonee estimations were lower for the years of 1989-1990, but reported the
same trend of Gini decrease (by 0.8%) as SWIID.
Figure 1. Income inequality in the Czech Republic, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
Both SWIID and Cornia found an increase of about 1.5% in the Gini coefficient in 1991.
However,  further  assessment  varies  greatly:  the  following  year,  SWIID  estimated  the
inequality at the level of 23.2%, that is considerably higher than the assessment of Cornia
(18.1%).  According  to  the  latter,  the  Czech  Republic  experienced  a  rapid  decrease  in
income inequality by 4.1%. The explanation might lie in the differences in methodology:
since Cornia relied mostly on consumption data of middle-income households, it  might
simply mean that the ‘middle class’ during 1991 spent their income in a more “equal” way.
Gradual increase in Gini coefficient was reported by various sources for the years 1992-
1994, the highest level pointed out by SWIID (25.6% for 1994).
Transmonee estimations for the period from the year 1992 on showed somewhat smaller
income inequality than reported by other sources. Such differences can be coming from
methodological aspects, meaning that it might indicate that children and women in Czech
Republic were in a slightly better position compared to the rest of social groups throughout
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the years of 1992-2009. Although, according to Transmonee database, the Gini fluctuated
between 21.4% and 25.8%, the highest point being recorded for the year of 2005.
According to the SWIID database, the situation in the country in terms of income inequality
stabilised in 1994, and the Czech Republic has not experienced any significant changes,
only slight increases in 1999 and 2002, followed by the decline of the Gini. According to
SWIID, the Czech Republic reached 25.1% of the Gini in 2012, which is close to the level
of 1995 (25.2%).
The findings of OECD and Eurostat after the years of 2004-2005 go along with SWIID
estimations, OECD giving somewhat higher scores to Gini, especially in 2013 – 0.7% more
than Eurostat. After 2004, the biggest gap between the rich and the poor was reported as
26% in 2005 by Eurostat, and 26.1% by OECD for the same year.
Using SWIID data, stabilisation of the Gini coefficient at around 25.5% level can be noted
already from 1994 – within following 20 years the Gini coefficient fluctuated within the
range of 1.6% Gini.
3.1.2. Gini coefficient fluctuations in Slovakia
Figure 2 summarises the findings of Gini coefficients derived from different sources for the
case of Slovakia.
Unlike in the case of the Czech Republic, SWIID on average reports lower level of income
inequality for the whole period of interest than other analysed sources. As elaborated above,
such differences before 1993 might have been caused by difficulties with division of the
data between Czech and Slovak lands during Czechoslovakia time.
In 1985, in the beginning of transition that was initiated by communist governments, the
Gini coefficient was estimated by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) at the level of 19.8%.
By 1988, it constituted even less – 19.4%, or 19.5% as reported by Milanovic (1998).
The decrease in Gini coefficient was also recorded by SWIID – it constituted 15.7% in
1989. The database sources reveal that such an optimistic estimation is based on Garner and
Terrell’s paper (1997), who argued that income inequality in Slovakia was over-estimated,
47
and in order to prove it, they tried to evaluate also the benefits in kind and include their
estimations. Cornia (1994), though, based his calculations on disposable income, and he
was less optimistic about income inequality in Slovakia for that year, estimating the Gini as
18.3%.
Figure 2. Income inequality in Slovakia, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
A following gradual, relatively fast increase of the gap between the rich and the poor was
found by SWIID, while Cornia reported a slight decrease in Gini coefficient for the years
1989-1991. In the end,  both of the sources  estimated income inequality  in  Slovakia as
around 18% Gini in 1991 and 18.9% in 1992.
According to SWIID, rapid increase in income inequality got off the mark in 1993, when
the Gini grew from 19.4% to 25% by 1996.
The same database also reported a following slight decrease of 0.7% by 1999. Transmonee
assessed the same period of 1996-1999 in a different way, characterising it  with actual
increase in income inequality with the highest score of 26.2% given for 1998.
The years of 1999-2002 showed an increase in income inequality. Transmonee researchers
found a somewhat larger degree though. The following year of 2003 was assessed even
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more differently: SWIID recorded the beginning of slight but gradual decrease of income
inequality, while Transmonee found an upwards leap the same year (29.9%).
The years of 2002 to 2007 were characterised by a continuous gradual decrease in income
inequality as reported by SWIID, whilst the rest of the sources showed other trends. An
overall decrease was found to be not that smooth, with Gini rapidly swinging up and down,
by Transmonee. At the same time, OECD recorded a 1.4% increase in Gini for 2004-2005,
and Eurostat – a 1.9% increase in 2005-2006, followed by a rapid fall of almost 4% the
following year.
Scholars estimated the Gini coefficient for the year of 2007 equally, giving Slovakia a score
of approximately 24.5%.
The change in income inequality distribution was reflected by sources slightly in a different
way.  Eurostat  and Transmonee recorded a  decrease  of  approximately  1.5% Gini,  while
SWIID and OECD found an increase of about 0.8%.
From 2008 to 2011, the Gini coefficient was slightly growing according to all the databases.
It reached a mark of around 26% in 2011, and then slightly dropped at 25% level.
For  the  years  2012-2014,  the  databases  reported  reverse  trends.  According  to  OECD,
Slovakia experienced a rapid increase of almost 2% in Gini in 2013, followed by a drop of
2.2%, reaching the level  of  24.7% in 2014.  Eurostat,  on the contrary,  outlined  a  rapid
decrease in the Gini coefficient of 1.1% in 2013, followed by an upward swing hitting the
mark of 26.1% in 2014.
It  might  be  cautiously  noted  that  the  gap  between  the  rich  and  the  poor  stabilised  in
Slovakia  after  1996.  On  average,  since  then  the  Gini  coefficient  constituted  25%,
fluctuating within the range of approximately 5% Gini.
3.1.3. Costs of transformation: fast growth of Gini in Estonia
The estimations of income inequality in the Baltic States, including Estonia, seem to vary to
a greater degree rather than in case of Czech and Slovak Republics.
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Estonia  experienced  a  slight  decrease  in  income  inequality  during  1985-1990  years
according to SWIID database, departing from 23.9% level and landing on the 22.5% mark.
The  SWIID’s  estimations  of  the  data  were  based  on  the  weighted  score  of  various
indicators.  For  the  years  1988  and  1990  only  the  gross  income  was  reported,  so  the
disposable income for these years was statistically computed, while the data for 1989 is
based on a ready-made disposable income per capita data. Thus, most of the years in this
period were likely to be estimated only approximately, as well as the redistributive role of
the government was being captured rather intuitively.
Figure 3. Income inequality in Estonia, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
Atkinson  and  Micklewright  (1992)  were  less  optimistic  about  Estonia’s  performance,
giving the country almost a 30% score. However,  as they noted, their  estimations were
based on the consumption data only for workers and collective farm workers, which does
not reflect the actual distribution of income among other groups,  and the estimation of
disposable income was rather approximate. Transmonee findings, that are more sensitive
towards the situation of children and women, are relatively more optimistic than the ones of
Atkinson and Micklewright – 28% Gini.
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During the years  of  1990-1992,  Estonia experienced a  sharp leap in  terms of  the  Gini
coefficient – from 22.5% to 35.6% or more than 13%.
According to the same dataset, the increase in the following year was not that rapid – only
1.1%.
From 1993 to 1997, SWIID reported a slow but gradual decrease in income inequality,
assessing the indicator for 1997 as 34.6% Gini. Milanovic (1998) assessed the data on 1995
in a similar way, giving Estonia an approximately the same score of 35.4% Gini. Mitra and
Yemtsov (2006), who analysed the data on consumption, computed the Gini for 1994 as
39.5%, which is even higher than SWIID estimations.
1997-2000 years were characterised by SWIID by a gradual increase in income inequality,
when the Gini coefficient hit a mark of 36.1%.
Transmonee researchers’ estimations followed the same dynamics as the ones of SWIID,
however,  reporting more dramatic  changes.  According to Transmonee database,  Estonia
from 1995 to 1998 experienced a large drop of 4.4% of the Gini, and then rose again to
38.9% in 2000. In other words, it seems that the households consisting of more children
were found to be more vulnerable in terms of income inequality.
Income inequality dropped between 2000 and 2001 by approximately 1% according to all
the estimations.
Mitra and Yemtsov provided their calculations based on consumption data from Estonian
surveys for the years of 2000-2003. They also recorded a slight drop of the income gap,
reporting lower Gini coefficients though. This might be the result of mitigating effects of
external factors.
The Transmonee database, on the contrary, reported a rapid increase in income inequality
for  the  same years,  from 38.9% to  40.2% Gini  coefficient.  The following  three  years,
according to the same database, Estonia experienced a relatively sharp decrease in income
inequality,  reaching a level of 36.1% of Gini in 2005. Eurostat  recorded even a bigger
decrease of Gini between 2004 and 2005 – by 3.3%. SWIID, for the same years,  also
reported a decrease, but a slower one, giving a score of 34.1% for the year of 2005.
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According to  SWIID, Estonia’s  Gini  coefficient  kept  falling  till  2008,  when it  reached
31.8%, that is close to the indicators of 1991, when the country got independence. Then it
slightly rose in 2011, but only by 0.2% Gini.
Eurostat’s estimations for the years of 2005-2011 go somewhat in line with the SWIID one.
According to the dataset, from 2011 to 2014 the gap between the rich and the poor was only
growing,  reaching the point  of 35.6% Gini.  OECD calculations,  providing only for the
years 2013-2014, actually showed a reversed trend – the organisation recorded a drop of the
Gini by 1.1%, giving Estonia the score of 34.6% level in 2014.
Generally, it might be said that the Gini coefficient in Estonia to some extent had already
stabilised after 1992. However, it fluctuated within a wide range – between 30% and 36%,
according to SWIID.
3.1.4. Slow but gradual rise in income inequality: evidence from Latvia
The years of transition under communist rule in Latvia were also characterised by a slight
decrease  in  the  Gini  coefficient:  from 22.9% in  1985 to  22.1% in  1988,  according  to
SWIID. For these years, as in the case of Estonia, the database estimations rely on the
figures of gross income per capita, taking into account only estimated effect of taxation and
provision with benefits.
The data for 1989 was assessed by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) in a less optimistic
way. While SWIID provided a 23.2% Gini for Latvia, the British scholars gave it 27.4%. As
well  as  in  the  case  of  Estonia,  the  researchers  mostly  relied  on  the  consumption  data
available  for  workers  and collective  farm workers,  leaving aside  other  groups of  wage
earners.  Transmonee  researchers  were  also  rather  pessimistic  about  the  situation  with
income inequality in Latvia, providing a score of 26%.
From 1990 to 2008, SWIID reported a relatively slow but continuous increase in income
inequality – from 22.5% to 36.1% of Gini.
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For the earlier period, only Ferreira and Ravallion’s (2008) estimation for the year of 1995
is available among other sources. They calculated the Gini as 31%, based on household
consumption data, which is 1.2% higher than the score provided by SWIID.
The increase in income inequality for the years of 1996-1998 was also noted by Mitra and
Yemtsov (2006). Their estimations of the income gap based on consumption data turned out
to be slightly higher: they recorded the increase of Gini from 31.6% to 33.6% level.
Figure 4. Income inequality in Latvia, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
According  to  Transmonee  database,  though,  income  inequality  almost  did  not  change
between the years 1997-2000, fluctuating around 33% of Gini.
Mitra and Yemtsov’s estimations for 2002-2003 go in line with SWIID weighted scores.
Transmonee  data  during  2002-2004  showed  a  somewhat  worse  situation  with  income
inequality, noting an increase from 35.8% to 39.1%.
The period of 2004-2007 in Latvia was assessed by the researchers in a rather different
way. While SWIID presented a slight growth in Gini, OECD reported its rapid increase by
almost 3% in 2005, followed by a relatively large drop of 4%. Eurostat reflected the same
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trend, but a year later: according to the database, Gini increased up to 38.9% in 2006, and
then fell to the 35.4% mark in 2007.
After  2007,  different  databases  recorded  somewhat  the  same rage  of  Gini  fluctuations
around 36% of Gini. Although, Eurostat gave Latvia higher scores, OECD assessed the gap
between the rich and the poor in a more moderate way.
It can be summarised that Latvia’s Gini got stable only after 2004, fluctuating around 36%
of the Gini coefficient.
3.1.5. Hopping growth of income inequality: data on Lithuania
For the case of Lithuania, the data is also rather scarce for the years of transition under
communist rule. Relying on the data of gross income in 1988 and disposable income in
1989 per capita, a slight increase of income inequality was estimated by SWIID during the
years 1985-1989, from 22 to 23.7%.
Alternative sources are available for the year of 1989. Transmonee gave Lithuania a score
of 26.3%, while Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) assessed it as 27.8%.
Figure 5. Income inequality in Lithuania, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
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A slight decrease in Gini coefficient recorded by SWIID for 1989-1990 was followed by its
rapid upwards leap. According to the same source, by 1994, the Gini coefficient already
constituted 32.3%, and kept only rising, much slower though, for the following years.
Ferreira and Ravallion (2008), using the data on households consumption, estimated the
Gini coefficient of 1994 as a much higher one – 37.3%. That might mean that during the
first  years  of  independence  the shadow economy,  or  indirect  taxation,  or  other  hard to
capture factors only contributed to higher income inequality.
For  the  next  decade,  from  1995  to  2004,  according  to  SWIID,  the  level  of  income
inequality in Lithuania was relatively stable, varying from 32.4% to 33.1%.
According to the same source, Lithuania experienced a relatively sharp increase by almost
3% in the Gini coefficient during the years 2004-2007, later on stabilising at the level of
approximately 35.3%.
Mitra  and  Yemtsov  (2006),  who  estimated  the  data  of  1998-2003  years,  also  noted  a
stabilisation of Gini coefficient with its slight increase by 2003. Their scores, based on the
consumption  data,  were  smaller  than the  ones  provided by other  sources,  which  might
indicate  a  mitigating  effect  of  some  external  factors  on  income  inequality  during  that
period.
Transmonee observations are quite different from other sources. The researchers recorded a
relatively  rapid  decrease  in  income inequality  in  1996-1997,  but  then  reported  a  rapid
upwards trend for the following five years, when, according to their estimations, the Gini
coefficient reached 35.7% level in 2002.
Various estimations of income inequality in 2003, though, are quite similar – around 32%
Gini.
According to  SWIID database,  the  level  of  income inequality  was steadily  growing in
Lithuania from 2004 to 2008, later on stabilising at a level of 35.5%.
The trends reported by OECD and Eurostat  are  somewhat  different.  OECD recorded a
number of rises and falls during 2004-2014, the lowest point of 32.2% being in 2011, a high
score of 36.6% in 2009, and the highest one – 38.1% in 2014. Eurostat’s data repeats the
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same trend, but with one year lag, giving the highest score of Gini coefficient as 37% in
2010, and the lowest one as 32% in 2012.
The assessment of income inequality in Lithuania was rather controversial. However, with
caution,  it  is  still  possible  to  say  that  the  country  experienced  two  periods  of  Gini
coefficient stabilisation: from 1994 to 2004 at the level of 32-33%, and from 2007 to 2014
at the level of 35-36%.
3.1.6. Contrasting the neighbours: cross-country comparison
Czech and Slovak lands, when being part of the same country, were not so similar in terms
of income inequality, as proven by the researchers’ assessments shown on Figure 6.
SWIID researchers findings tend to estimate Slovakia’s Gini coefficient to some extent
lower than the Czech Republic’s one. As already discussed, any differences in estimations
of Czech and Slovak Republics’ Gini coefficients before 1993 should be treated carefully,
since scholars stressed the difficulties faced while separating the data.
According to Atkinson and Micklewright’s (1992) estimations, Czech and Slovak lands in
1985 were rather equal in terms of distribution of income. In 1988, they found Slovakia’s
Gini somewhat lower than the one of the Czech Republic – 19.4% and 19.8% respectively.
Milanovic (1998) evaluated the Gini coefficients for the same year as almost equal – 19.5%
and 19.4% accordingly. The score given to the countries by Cornia (1994) for the year of
1989 is also more or less the same – 18.5% and 18.3% respectively.
SWIID weighted coefficients present a rather different picture for the same period of time.
According to the database, while Czech lands were experiencing slight rise in inequality in
1987-1989 by 0.7%, the Slovak part was getting closer to the line of perfect equality by
1.8%.
Starting  from  the  period  of  economic  liberalisation,  SWIID  estimated  Slovakia’s  Gini
somewhat lower than in the Czech Republic with the exception of three periods. Inequality
in Slovakia did not reach the level of Czech Republic until 2001, the level of inequality in
Slovakia was almost the same as in the Czech Republic in 1996 though. After that, SWIID
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was giving Slovakia the same or even higher scores, the latter during the periods of 2001-
2004 and from 2007 on.
Figure 6. Income inequality in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, by source, 1985-2014
Source: Author’s own construction
The Transmonee database, on the contrary, tends to estimate the Czech Republic as more
equal rather than Slovakia, with the only exception of the years 2005 and 2006, when the
countries were given the same scores. In case of Transmonee estimations, however, there is
an  alternative  explanation  of  different  results  discussed  above:  it  is  likely  that  the
households  with  children  were  in  a  better  situation  in  the  Czech  rather  than  Slovak
Republic.
According to Eurostat data, it was not so clear who was “more equal”, the Czech Republic
or Slovakia, However, the fluctuations range of the Gini coefficients was estimated higher
in case of Slovakia, even though the countries followed very similar trends. OECD, that
relies on the same methodology as Eurostat, presented slightly different coefficients, but at
the same time a similar trend: less stable income distribution situation in Slovakia. On the
other hand, OECD estimations in the period of 2007-2014 to some extent mirror the ones of
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Eurostat, recording an increase of inequality when Eurostat reported the decrease, and vice
versa.
According  to  all  the  estimations,  Slovakia,  compared  to  the  Czech  Republic,  used  to
perform a lower Gini coefficient before 1996, when after experiencing ten consequent years
of  its  growth,  it  finally  caught  up  with  its  neighbour  in  terms  of  income  inequality.
Slovakia’s trend is not as stable as the one of the Czech Republic, the former one being
characterised with relatively sharp declines and upward leaps in the Gini coefficient, while
Czech Republic’s Gini grew steadily but slowly.
Generally  experiencing  more  “fair”  income  distribution,  Slovakia  outperformed  Czech
Republic in a number of years – in 2001-2003, 2005, 2009-2010, and 2013. However, the
difference in Gini coefficients was still relatively small.
On average, the Czech and Slovak Republics raised their Gini coefficients by 5% by 2014.
Figures 7 and 8 present the comparison of the Gini coefficients in the Baltic States, reported
as household income or consumption per capita respectively. Atkinson and Micklewright’s
(1992) estimations are also presented in Figure 8 since they partially captured also benefits
in  kind,  which  is  more likely  captured  by consumption  estimations  rather  than income
reported per se.
Before 1988, SWIID estimated Estonia’s Gini coefficient the highest one, though Lithuania
looked the most “equal” compared to its neighbours. While in 1988, the countries caught up
with each other, in the following two years Estonia’s situation was stable, whereas Latvia
and  to  a  bigger  extent  Lithuania  experienced  an  upwards  leap  in  the  Gini  coefficient,
coming back to the same level as Estonia by 1990.
The  Transmonee  database  presents  the  situation  only  for  1989  and  estimates  the  Gini
coefficients for the Baltic States higher somewhat by 5%. This assessment goes along with
the SWIID finding that  Estonia  was the  most  “unequal” in  the beginning of  transition
period, but at the same time provides Latvia with the lowest Gini score.
The Gini  coefficients  for  1900-1994 were estimated only by SWIID. According to  the
database, Estonia experienced the fastest increase in income inequality, reaching 36.7% by
1993, followed by a slight decrease in 1994. Lithuania’s Gini coefficient was rising a bit
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slower,  but  the  process  noticeably  slowed  only  after  1994.  Latvia,  compared  to  its
neighbours, experienced the slowest growth in Gini coefficient, which, however, did not
stop up to 2006.
The Transmonee estimations are less optimistic than the ones of SWIID. Estonia was still
presented  as  the  least  equal  country  from  1995  up  to  2003.  Latvia,  according  to
Transmonee,  performed better  only in  1998 to  2000,  generally  conceding to  Lithuania.
Interestingly, for the years 2002-2004 a rapid increase in income inequality is reported for
Estonia  and Latvia,  while  Lithuania’s  Gini  was going down during  that  time,  reaching
30.9% by 2004. As already discussed, Transmonee indicators are more sensitive towards
the position of households with women and children.
Figure 7. Income inequality in the Baltic States measured by reported income, by source, 1985-
2014
Source: Author’s own construction
Eurostat estimated the Gini coefficient in 2000 as more moderate than Transmonee in the
cases of Estonia and Lithuania, giving Latvia at the same time a higher score than other
databases.
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Income  distribution  trends  changed  after  2004,  according  to  all  sources.  Since  then,
Estonia’s Gini started decreasing, and gradually Estonia became the most “equal” in terms
of household income among its neighbours. At the same time, OECD estimated the Gini in
Estonia as about 3-4% higher,  than other databases,  from 2007, and, therefore,  did not
recognised  a  rapid  fall  of  the  Gini  reported  by  others.  Lithuania,  according  to  all  the
sources,  was  going  through larger  fluctuations  in  the  Gini  compared to  Latvia.  But  in
general, the Gini coefficient for the Baltic states fluctuated between 31% and 39%.
Figure  8  combines  the  estimations  made  by  different  sources  based  on  the  income
consumption, including the indicators provided by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), who
also took partially into account benefits in kind. The Gini coefficient based on consumption
performs somewhat 5-7% level higher, rather than the ones based on reported income.
Atkinson and Micklewright’s (1992) findings for the year of 1989 confirm the position of
the Baltic States on y-axes scale. Their methodology applied, the income distribution was
less “fair” in all the Baltic States, compared to the indicators provided by SWIID for the
same year, resembling more with Transmonee assessment.
Mitra and Yemtsov’s (2006) findings go along with the trends outlined by other databases.
In general,  Estonia,  being always the most “unequal” country,  managed to improve the
situation by gradually decreasing inequality, and already by 2003 became almost as “equal”
as Lithuania, the countries obtained 33% and 32.5% Gini respectively. Latvia, which back
in 1996 performed the smallest Gini, experienced a gradual increase of income inequality,
and by the end of observations, by 2003, hit the highest score of 35% among the Baltic
States. Lithuania was the most “equal” country starting from 1998, performing at around
30% Gini and experiencing an upwards leap in 2003.
Ferreira and Ravallion (2008) estimated the situation in Latvia for 1995 and in Lithuania
for 1994. The trend revealed by other sources was confirmed: during that period, Latvia
appears to have much smaller (by 6%) Gini coefficient.
To summarize, chosen methodology influenced the final Gini score to a great extent in case
of the Baltic States, the difference between the estimations being close to 10%. However,
regardless  the  sources  used,  the  general  trend  was  as  follows:  during  first  years  of
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transition, Estonian households were the least “equal” in terms of income, while Latvia
performed the best. The speed in income inequality growth was the highest in Estonia and
the slowest in Latvia. After 2000, the trends had reversed: Estonia started to improve the
situation  slowly,  while  Latvia  and  Lithuania  experienced  large  fluctuations  in  the  Gini
coefficient and, in the end, became the most “unequal” states.
Figure 8. Income inequality in the Baltic States measured by consumption, by source, 1989-2003
Source: Author’s own construction
On average, the Baltic states’ Gini coefficients increased from 1985 to 2014 by around
12%.
3.1.7. General trends: cross-group comparison
Figure 9 represents the trends in income inequality expressed by Gini coefficients for all
five countries of study. As discussed and proven in Chapter Two, before 2004 the data
derived  from SWIID database  is  used  to  make  cross-countries  comparisons,  since  the
differences in Gini coefficient assessment were explained by methodological approach, and
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SWIID indicators were proven to be consistent with the definition of household income
used in this study.
After the liberalisation, all  the countries became more “unequal” in terms of household
income. However, the Czech and Slovak Republics managed to maintain lower levels of
inequality in comparison with the Baltic States.
During  the  communist  rule,  the  countries  were  relatively  equal  in  terms  of  income
distribution. The Czech and Slovak Republics were performing slightly better, their Gini
coefficients  being  estimated  at  approximately  20% level.  The  Baltic  States  performed
somewhat worse, still keeping relatively low level of income inequality though – around
23%.
The trends of income inequality  in  two groups of countries dramatically  changed after
1990. Even though income inequality was rising everywhere, the speed of increase was
much higher in case of Estonia and Lithuania, and generally the Gini coefficient kept rising
in these two countries for a couple of years. However, such a statement should be made
with a note that the increase of inequality could have started even earlier, before 1989, if
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) estimations are taken into account.
Surprisingly, Latvia first followed the same pattern as Czech and Slovak Republics, but
then the Gini coefficient continued to rise in the Baltic States, when it got relatively stable
in Czech and Slovak Republics after 1995, fluctuating at the level about 26%.
Slovakia stands out of the rest of the countries as for the year of 1989. When the Baltic
States and the Czech Republic were already experiencing a gradual but relatively slow
growth in income inequality, the drop by 2.5% was recorded from 1988 to 1989, followed
by continuous gradual increase for the next seven consequent years. However, as discussed
in the previous section, if Cornia’s (1994) estimations of household disposable income are
taken into account, Slovakia is no longer an outlier.
From 1988 to 1989, Latvia and Lithuania experienced a rise of income inequality level of
about  1%,  while  Estonia  maintained  the  same Gini  coefficient.  Latvia  and Lithuania’s
performance, thus, was relatively similar to the Czech one, that experienced a rise of 0.5%
in its Gini coefficient.
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Figure 9. Income inequality in transition countries, by country, 1985-2014
Sources: Atkinson & Micklewright (1992) (for Slovakia, 1985), SWIID 4.0 (for all the countries,
before 2005), Eurostat (for all the countries, 2005 and after)
However,  when  looking  at  Atkinson  and  Micklewright  (1992)  calculations,  the  overall
picture for the Baltic States looks different. In 1989, Estonia was the most ‘unequal’ among
the Baltics, reaching almost 30% Gini, when Latvia and Lithuania performed slightly better
– with 27.8% and 27.4% respectively.
Whatever estimations are taken into account, income inequality rose in all of the countries
of study after 1990, the biggest change, according to SWIID, recorded for Estonia – 6.6%.
Lithuania experienced a 3.1% increase in Gini, while Latvia – 1.9%. The Czech Republic
and Slovakia performed slightly better  than Latvia,  having experienced the increase  of
1.5% and 1% respectively.
Since  then  the  distance  between  the  two  group  of  countries,  the  Czech  Republic  and
Slovakia and the Baltic States,  was only growing, stabilising somewhat in the years of
2000s and constituting 7-10% of difference measured by the Gini coefficient.
Interesting patterns can be seen form the graph on the Figure 9. In some periods of time, the
Gini dynamics of Latvia resembled the one of Slovakia, only at higher Gini level and with a
bigger amplitude. For example, from 1990 to 1994, income inequality in these countries
was growing in line, Latvia’s Gini being estimated about 5% higher than the Slovakia’s
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one. In 2006, both countries experienced a similar increase in Gini coefficient – Latvia by
2.7%, Slovakia – by 1.9%, followed by a larger and similar decrease in inequality by 2007
– Latvia by 3.5%, Slovakia – by 3.6%.
At the same time, in the period from 1990 to 2007, Lithuania’s pattern in Gini resembles
the  Czech  one,  with  the  same  note  of  different  levels  and  amplitude.  Both  countries
experienced a steady growth of income inequality up to 1994, then the situation relatively
stabilised until 2003. In 2004, Lithuania and the Czech Republic experienced an increase of
Gini coefficients, to a largely different extent though: the former one by 4.7%, while the
latter – by only 0.9%.
After 2007, neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia experienced rapid swings in the Gini
coefficients, unlike the Baltic States. The amplitude of Gini fluctuations of the latter since
2007 constituted about 6-7%.
To summarise, all the countries of study experienced a rapid and continuous increase in
income inequality during the time of transition. With time, the situation became stable, to
more extent in Czech and Slovak republic where the Gini stopped growing already in 1996,
while the Baltic States coefficient kept rising until the 2000s. In 1985, the difference in the
Gini coefficients between the groups of countries was 2-4%. The groups of countries ended
up in strikingly different positions: the gap between the Baltic States and the Czech and
Slovak Republics in 2014 constituted around almost 10%.
3.2. Getting rich at the expense of ‘middle class’: decile ratio comparison
As discussed in Chapter One, the comparison of decile ratios represents a more simplified
alternative to Gini coefficient. It helps to compare how many times more income the richest
households get. As a complementarity to Gini, intermediate ratios are also compared to
understand “at whose expense” rich households obtain their income. In other words, such a
comparison illustrates closer to whom the middle-income groups stay, to the rich or to the
poor. As already mentioned, scholars generally agree that a bigger gap between ‘middle
class’ and the rich is more justified and acceptable.
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The income distribution among the bottom, middle, and upper income deciles – D1, D5,
and D10 respectively – is depicted in Figures 19-21, the calculations are presented in Table
1 (cf. Appendix 1).
The poorest households in the Czech and Slovak Republics obtain a larger share of national
income, than their counterparts from the Baltic States. The share of Czech Republic and
Slovakia’s  bottom  decile  income  was  3.4%-4.2%,  while  the  one  of  the  Baltic  states
fluctuated between 1,9% and 3%.
The share of total national income by the Czech Republic bottom income decile has not
radically  changed over  time and stayed the  largest  among the  compared countries:  the
poorest 10% of households obtain 4-4.2%.
The dynamics of Slovakia’s income distribution was not as stable as in the Czech Republic.
The poorest 10% of households increased their income by 2008 from 3.4 to 4%, and then
lost their share by about 0.5%, the lowest share being 3.3% in 2014.
The poorest 10% of households in the Baltic States were in the worse position during the
whole period of study.
Estonia’s bottom income groups increased their share by 2009 from 1.9% to 3%. However,
from 2010 they were getting less and less income, ending at the mark of 2.2% in 2014, the
same position as Latvia.
Lithuania’s poorest households performed worse than Estonia’s before 2012, but better than
Latvia’s  throughout  the  whole  period,  with  the  exception  of  the  year  2010,  when
Lithuania’s  households  received a  0.1% share  lower  than  Latvia’s.  The bottom income
households in Lithuania have changed their position over time: they increased their share
by 0.3% from 2002 to 2008, but after that lost 0.6% by 2010. Within the following two
years, they improved the situation by 0.8% share of national income by 2012 and arrived at
the 2.7% mark, the highest share within the study period. In 2014, the share of income
slightly reduced by 0.2%.
Latvia’s  poorest  households  on  average  received  the  lowest  share  of  national  income
compared to the rest of the countries studied, with the only exception being in 2010, when
they were found in a slightly better situation than in Lithuania. The share fluctuated within
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a small range, between 2% and 2.4%, with the lowest records in 2006 and 2010, and the
highest one in 2007.
Middle income deciles share in the countries of study did not differ to a great extent, Czech
Republic  and Slovakia’s  households  still  found themselves  in  a  slightly  better  position
though as  compared to  the Baltic  States.  All  of  the  countries  did not  experience rapid
increase or decrease in terms of ‘middle class’ income.
The share of Slovakia’s middle income group was slightly, by 0.1-0.2% bigger than the
ones  of  the  Czech  Republic  with  the  exception  of  2006,  when  the  Czech  Republic’s
households performed slightly better. The range of national income share is rather small:
the percentage varying from 8.2-8.9% for both countries.
The share of national income for middle income groups for the Baltic states was somewhat
smaller: from 7.1% to 8.2%.
Estonia’s ‘middle class’ was found to be in  a better  position as compared to  its  Baltic
neighbours, with the sole exception of 2014, when Estonian households obtained the same
share of 7.5% as Lithuania’s, or 0.1% less than Latvia’s.
Most of the time Lithuanian households were found to be in a slightly better position than
Latvia’s, obtaining 0.2-0.6% bigger share of national income, with the exception of the
years 2005, 2009-2010, when their shares were equal, and 2014, when Latvia outperformed
its neighbours by 0.1%.
The upper income decile households, on the contrary, were in a better position in the Baltic
States,  on  average  obtaining  about  5%  of  national  income  more  than  the  Czech  or
Slovakian ones.
Throughout the years, the richest decile of households in the Czech Republic was getting
about 1-1.5% more than their Slovakian counterparts, with the exception of 2007, when
Slovakia’s upper income groups significantly outperformed the Czech ones by 2.6%.
Czech  Republic’s  richest  households  did  not  experience  significant  changes  in  their
national income share within the years, the share being between 21.4-22.2%. The position
of Slovakia’s upper income groups was less stable: the households increased their share to
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24.5% in 2006, the highest index. Already in 2007, they had lost 3.5%, and since then the
households were getting 19.5-21.5% of national income.
Estonia’s  upper  income  households  were  not  in  a  favourable  position  as  much  as  its
neighbours. However, their share of income since 2015 was relatively stable, fluctuating
between 23.4% (in 2008) and 26% (in 2014).
Latvia and Lithuania’s indicators were relatively close to each other, Latvian households
getting  a  somewhat  bigger  share  of  national  income,  but  followed  different  trends
throughout the years.
Latvian households experienced an increase in their income to 29.2% in 2006, the highest
indicator for the study period for all the Baltic states, but lost their share afterwards, getting
from 26% (in 2011) to 27.6% (in 2008).
Lithuania’s upper decile income households on average obtained 26% of national income,
experiencing a relatively significant loss of their share in 2011-2012 (24.4% and 23.9%),
right after they increased it to 27.4% in 2009-2010.
The decile ratios calculations are summarised in Table 1 (cf. Annex 1), where the red colour
cells signify the smaller ratio of D10/D5 compared to D5/D1, yellow labels the situations
when D5/D1 is  somewhat  smaller  than D10/D5,  and the cells  without  colour  illustrate
somewhat equal ratios.
In the Czech Republic, the ‘middle class’ was always situated closer to the poorest decile in
income distribution picture, meaning that the richest part of population made their income
“at the expense” of the middle group, not the poor. The difference between the decile shares
was always stable, constituting about 0,5.
Slovakia’s ‘middle class’ on average found itself in the very middle of the distribution.
However,  in  2006-2007  the  situation  of  middle-income  households  was  similar  to  the
Czech one. In 2013, on the contrary, the middle group shifted a bit upwards on the line of
distribution, meaning that the richest decile obtained more income “at the expense” of the
poor, the difference between the shares being about 0.35.
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In Estonia, before 2010, the distance between the upper and middle income deciles was 0.2-
0.6 points bigger than the one between the middle group and the bottom income decile.
After 2010, the middle class was found somewhat in the middle of income distribution.
Latvia’s richest 10% of household were mostly getting their share of income at the expense
of the middle class, with the exception of the year 2010, when they obtained income rather
at the expense of the poorest part of the population, the difference being about 0.5. 
In Lithuania, the situation with income distribution between the groups was similar to the
one of Latvia, with the 10% upper income decile obtaining the share of income rather at the
expense of the 10% bottom income decile in 2010 and 2011 – the difference was about 0.4.
Czech  and Slovak Republics’ poorest  decile  throughout  the  years  had  somewhat  1.5%
bigger share of income than their counterparts from the Baltic states. The middle income
group was also in a better position in Czech Republic in Slovakia, possessing about 1%
more of national income. The Baltics richest decile of the population, on the contrary, was
found to have about 5% of national income more than the corresponding group from the
Czech and Slovak Republics.
The analysis of decile ratios, though, did not show any clear pattern within or between the
comparison groups. The poor were in a more vulnerable situation only in couple of cases:
in Slovakia in 2013, in Latvia in 2010, and in Lithuania in 2010-2011.
3.3. Highly urbanised Czech Republic and relatively rural Slovakia: hypothesis not
supported
All of the countries either maintained their urbanisation level through the whole period of
studies, or experienced even its slight decrease, like Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia
(cf. Figure 22, Appendix 2).
Slovakia  stands  out  among the countries  as  the  least  urbanised.  In  1991,  only 57% of
population lived in towns and cities. By 2014, the indicator has decreased by 3%. Czech
Republic differs greatly from its neighbour: the share of urban population constituted about
75% in 1991, and about 73% in 2014.
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The  Baltic  states  within  time  became almost  equal  in  terms  of  urbanisation.  In  1991,
Lithuania was the most rural out of them, with 67.5% of population living in towns and
cities. Latvia took the middle position, accommodating about 69% of population in urban
zones. Estonia was the most urbanised country in the Baltic region, with 71% of population
living out of rural areas. However, by 2014 about 67.7% of the Baltic region population
lived in urban zones, the difference between the indicators being insignificant.
Therefore, there is no evidence from these countries supporting the hypothesis that higher
share of urban population is correlated with higher income inequality.
3.4. Labour vs. capital income: controversial findings
Figure 10 shows the distribution of labour income within the countries’ population, which
indicates the share of national income that is constituted by wages, taking into account also
the income derived from self-employment activities.
Figure 10. Adjusted wage share, %, by country, 1993-2014
Source: AMECO
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The Czech and Slovak Republics on average have lower percentage of income allocated to
wages. Before 1997, labour income constituted 42-46%, which is just 1-2% higher than in
case of Slovakia. In 1997, Slovakia increased its wage share to the Czech ones, and the
countries followed the same trend of slight decrease in wage share until 2000. Later on, the
picture changed: labour income increased by almost 3% by 2003, while Slovakia’s kept
shrinking, reaching 41.7% in 2004. From then until 2008 the shares were not changing
significantly. In 2009, Slovakia experienced an increase of more than 3% in 2009. Since
then its wage share kept falling, reaching about 44% in 2014. The Czech Republic has not
experienced significant changes during 2003-2014: the lowest share constituted 46.3% in
2007, and the highest one – 48.8% in 2012. In 2014, almost 47.5% of national income was
represented by wages.
The distribution of labour income in case of the Baltic States was more heterogeneous.
Estonia and Latvia followed a similar trend: their wage share increased in 1994 to about
53%, and then gradually declined to 2002, Estonia landing at a 48% level, while Latvia – at
44.5%. However, in case of Latvia, the decline was intermittent. From 2002 till 2004, the
countries  took  different  paths:  Latvia’s  indicator  kept  falling  to  44%,  while  Estonia
experienced an increase to 48,8% in labour income share. After that, the trends reversed,
and by 2006, the wage share constituted approximately the same percentage – about 47%,
that  is  close  to  the  Czech  Republic’s  indicator  for  the  same  year.  In  2007-2008,  the
countries were going in line, hitting the mark of 54%.From 2008 until 2014, Estonia and
Latvia experienced similar changes in national income composition, Latvia losing the wage
share of income more: by 2011, the share decreased by 6% in the case of Estonia and by
almost 10% in the case of Latvia. From 2012 to 2014, the countries experienced a gradual
rise of wage shares, arriving at 51% and 48.5% respectively.
Lithuania’s  situation  was  distinct  from the  one of  its  neighbours.  The wage share  was
increasing with high speed from 1991 to 1999, reaching the point  of 53.6% and, thus,
constituting a bigger share than in Estonia or Latvia. A fast increase was followed by a
relatively rapid decrease by 6% by 2001, when Lithuania reached Latvia’s indicator. From
then until 2004, Lithuania was going in line with Estonia. In 2006, Lithuania experienced
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an increase in wage share by 2.5%, but already the following year restored its position at
the  level  of  49.7%,  the  same as  Estonia  and  Latvia.  From 2008 until  2014,  Lithuania
followed the same trend as its Baltic neighbours, on average, however, performing at a 1-
2% lower share than Latvia.
On average, the Baltic States had a somewhat bigger share of labour income than the Czech
or  Slovak  Republics.  The  trend  changed  only  after  2010,  when  Latvia  and  Lithuania
performed with indicators closer to the ones of Slovakia, while the Czech Republic almost
caught up with Estonia in these terms.
We  expect  that  the  decrease  in  labour  share  should  result  in  the  increase  of  income
inequality, since the returns on capital are normally higher than wages. According to the
expectations,  if  the negative correlation is  proven, the line representing the wage share
should somewhat mirror the dynamics of the Gini. The evidence shows, that the change in
wage share might have had an influence on income inequality only in some particular cases
(cf. Figures 23-27, Appendix 3).
Negative correlation between the wage share and income inequality in the Czech Republic
might  be  noticed  only  starting  from the  year  of  2007,  when  the  Gini  coefficient  was
gradually  falling  down against  the  growing  share  of  wages.  Similarly,  the  increase  of
capital income by 1% is associated with the increase in Gini by 0.6% in 2014.
In the case of Slovakia, the correlation is visible for the period of 2000-2002 and 2005-
2006. When the labour income dropped by 0.8% from 2000 to 2002, the Gini coefficient
went up by 1%. In 2006, income inequality in Slovakia reached its highest level within the
study period – 28.1%, while the share of wage was one of the lowest – 41.7%.
In Estonia,  the changes  in  adjusted wage share can partially  explain income inequality
dynamics for a longer period of time. From 1997 to 2006, the line of the Gini coefficient
somewhat mirrored the changes in income composition. The Gini grew by 1.5%, when the
adjusted wage share decreased by 2.7%, and the Gini fell down to 33.1% by 2006, while
the  wage share  constituted  47.7%,  indicating,  though,  only  a  slight  decrease  of  capital
income share. Expected negative correlation was also found in 2007-2008 period, when the
wage share increased by 4.3% against the drop in the Gini by 2.5%.
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Latvia, that experienced the slowest growth of income inequality during the early years of
transition, at the same time performed the most gradual decrease in the wage share starting
from 1994. If in 1994, the Gini of 27.6% was associated with 56.6% of adjusted wage
share, in 2003 the Gini grew at 34.5% level, while the labour income share fell at 44.2%.
However, later on such negative correlation was not clear.
The situation with income inequality in Lithuania does not seem to be influenced by the
changes in income composition at all – the drops in wage share are mostly associated with
the corresponding decrease in income inequality, and vice versa.
The evidence of the chosen transition countries shows that change in wage/capital income
ratio  might  have  influenced the  income distribution  only  in  particular  periods  of  time.
Income inequality in Czech Republic was decreasing during the years of 2007-2014, when
the  share  of  labour  income  kept  growing.  In  Slovakia,  the  drop  of  wage  shares  was
associated with rising Gini coefficient during the periods of 2000-2002 and 2005-2006, the
latter period was characterised by the lowest wage shares and highest income inequality. In
the case of Estonia, income inequality was changing somewhat in accordance with wage
share changes in 1997-2006, and it is likely that the Gini drop in 2007-2008 was at least
partially caused by the rapid increase of labour income share. In Latvia, that experienced
gradual and steady growth of income inequality during 1994-2003, the wage share was also
gradually shrinking. In the case of Lithuania, though, there was no correlation between the
Gini coefficient and labour income share found.
3.5. General results of the macroeconomic and demographic indicators analysis
Transition,  or  shifting  from  central  planned  to  market  economy,  together  with  global
processes, increased income inequality in all the countries of study. The Czech and Slovak
Republics experienced that to a lower extent: their Gini dramatically went up during the
period of 1990-1996, later on relatively stabilised at about 25% level. The Baltic States
suffered income inequality rise to a greater extent. In 1990-1994, Estonia and Lithuania’s
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Gini  coefficient  grew by  about  15% and  10% respectively.  Latvia  followed  a  slightly
different  path though:  its  income inequality  kept  rising much slower,  but  by 2004,  the
country had caught up with its neighbours. Estonia after 2004 experienced a drop in Gini,
but by 2014, again reached the level of the years before the secession to the EU. Latvia and
Lithuania, on the contrary, experienced frequent rises and drops of the Gini, but by 2014
performed in the same way as Estonia.
The analysis of macroeconomic and demographic indicators gave little insight to the roots
of the problem. The most two “equal” states – the Czech and Slovak Republics – turned out
to be rather different in  their  level  of urbanisation.  The wage share in the countries of
interest was found to be only slightly correlated to the Gini coefficient dynamics, meaning
that the decrease in wage share that is supposed to be more equally distributed rather than
returns  on  capital  was  associated  with  the  increase  in  income  inequality  when  longer
periods  of  time  are  taken  into  account.  The  biggest  correlation  was  found  in  case  of
Estonia. However, Lithuania’s case does not support the hypothesis, because the variables
of interest were not correlated neither in the short, nor in the long term.
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Chapter Four. Policies of independent transition countries and their outcomes
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of policies that might have influenced the income
distribution  in  the  chosen  countries. It  starts  with  general  overview  of  the  countries
challenges faced in transition process and followed by the assessment of workers unions’
power. Then, the mass privatisation of 1990s, crucial tax reforms and cash benefits together
with  the  type  of  welfare  policies  are  analysed.  The  chapter  ends  with  provisional
conclusions regarding the union bargaining power and governmental policies effects.
4.1. The EU prospects: driving forces for changes
According to Aldcroft (2002), there were three main challenges that the states entering the
transition process faced at that time. First, to deal with the conversion of currency and do
best  to  survive  inevitable  severe  price  shocks.  Second,  to  get  rid  of  planned economy
system.  Third,  to  establish  legal  institutions  and  create  financial  conditions  favouring
private business.
Bohle and Greskovits (2012) stressed that Czechoslovakia, the future Czech Republic in
particular, had all the chances to become the most successful industrialiser and catch up
faster with Western European countries due to several quite obvious reasons. First, even
before joining the Communist bloc, some Czech lands had already been industrialized, so
for  them it  should  have  been  easier  to  come back to  relatively  established capitalism.
Secondly, these lands had already existed under democratic conditions, which is believed to
be a facilitating factor for transition to market economy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
Third,  evident geographical proximity to advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe
should be also taken into account.
Indeed, already in 1990, Czechoslovakia started negotiations with a view towards joining
the  European  Union.  They  agreed  to  help  an  emerging  capitalist  economy  with
technological  development  and  to  some  extent  financial  support  in  order  to  open  the
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Czechoslovak market to Western world. Negotiations with the Baltic States started in 1991,
after they gained independence.
Estonia was the first country that started the negotiations on the terms of accession to the
European Union in 1997, followed by Latvia and the Czech Republic in 1998. Slovakia was
invited to initiate the process in 1999. Lithuania was the last one to start the negotiations in
2000.
However,  since  the  transformation  process  in  former  Czechoslovakia  started  two years
earlier  than in  the Baltic  States,  by 1998 the Visegrad countries were characterized by
higher  levels  of  marketization,  while  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  lagged  behind  in
comparison.  Scholars  note  though,  that  due  to  the  historical  legacies  both  groups  of
countries, they started implementing new regimes largely from scratch. However, according
to Bohle  and Greskovits  research,  over  then ten  following years,  the Baltic  States  had
caught  up  –  already by 2007,  their  levels  of  marketization  had become rather  similar.
Moreover, during the years of recovery the Baltic States, which were highly dependent on
foreign loans, outperformed the Visegrad countries in price stability and fiscal performance
alike.
Having  started  later,  the  Baltic  States  underwent  the  most  radical  transformations  in
adopting a market economy, while the Czech and Slovak Republics were the proponents of
gradual transformation.
4.2. Unions losing power: the impact of wage bargaining on income inequality
Powerful trade worker unions were among the communist  legacies that in theory could
have helped to mitigate the impact of market forces on income inequality.
Scholars’ findings proved that powerful unions managed to mitigate capitalism’s outcomes
better,  helping  the  workers  to  obtain  a  better  income.  Thus,  it  is  assumed  that  bigger
bargaining power is associated with smaller gap between the rich and the poor.
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Figure 11 depicts the union density rate – a percentage of workers that are members of
unions from total  labour  force.  Figure 12 reflects  the percentage of employees  in each
country that are covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Figure 11. Union density rate, by country, 1992-2013
Source: ICTWSS 5.0
Figure 12. Adjusted bargaining coverage rate, by country, 1992-2013
Source: ICTWSS 5.0
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Since  the  beginning  of  1990s,  by  2014  the  share  of  workers  participating  in  unions
drastically decreased in all  of the countries.  For example,  about 90% of workers had a
union  membership  in  1990,  while  in  2012  –  less  than  7%.  The  communist  regime
encouraged  the  workers  to  become  unionised,  while  the  rules  of  capitalism  do  not
necessarily require collective workers power.
In 2012-2013, union density rate in all the countries constituted between 6.5%-13.3%. The
Czech and Slovak Republics preserved a larger share of union members, as well as Latvia,
in which the union density rate was 4-6.5% higher than that of its Baltic neighbours.
The clear difference between the groups of countries is visible when bargaining coverage
power  is  observed.  Even being weakly  unionised,  a  larger  share  of  Czech  and Slovak
workers enjoy the possibility of wage setting by collective bargaining agreements – on
average after 2000, 50% of Czech workers and 40% of Slovak ones, even the latter ones’
share decreased at  25% by 2013. As for the Baltic states,  after  2000 Estonian workers
bargaining coverage rate on average constituted about 25%, Latvian – 17%, Lithuanian –
10%.
With time,  unions  in the countries  lost  their  popularity,  and the membership decreased
dramatically in all the countries of study. Bargaining coverage rate also shrunk during the
capitalism.
Czech and Slovak Republics’ workers,  even though being weakly unionized,  enjoyed a
greater  degree  of  bargaining  power  as  compared  to  the  Baltic  states.  Among  Latvian
employees, that were unionized to a greater extent compared to the Baltic neighbors, less
than one fifth enjoyed some collective bargaining power. Estonian and Lithuanian workers
were found in the most volatile position according to both of the indicators.
Thus, in case of the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Baltic states, it might be noted
that the former group of unionized workers was larger, and a bigger share of them enjoyed
collective bargaining agreements.  Therefore,  even to  a  small  extent  though,  Czech and
Slovak workers had higher chances to influence their wage and thus improve their income
situation, which reduced income inequality in the given countries.
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4.3. Privatisation process: shaping capital share in 1990s
The privatisation process  in  the countries of study was going on for a decade,  but  the
largest part of enterprises were privatised within a rather short period of time: by 1995,
more than half of the countries’ GDP was constituted by private sector activities. Figure 13
illustrates the changes in the private sector share in GDP.
Figure 13. Private sector share in GDP, by country, 1991-1999
Source: EBRD (2000)
The  Czech  Republic’s  private  sector  was  growing  with  the  greatest  speed:  in  1995,  it
already constituted 70% of GDP. Slovakia’s private sector was growing somewhat slower,
together with Estonia and Lithuania’s one – it constituted 70% in 1996, one year after the
Czech Republic. Latvia’s private sector in GDP only reached the 60% mark in 1997.
4.3.1. Privatisation started in Czechoslovakia: reliance on the voucher system
The  process  of  redistributing  enterprises  to  private  owners  in  the  Czech  and  Slovak
Republics in the 1990s started still under the Czechoslovakia state government. In 1990, the
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share of private sector constituted only 4% of GDP (Dyba & Svejnar, 1995). The preference
was  given to  a  voucher  system,  and it  was  generally  considered  as  a  “fair  model”  by
scholars: the information on balance sheets and income statements was easily available.
Voucher privatisation was supposed to redistribute about 40% of state-owned enterprises
(Mejstrik  et  al.,1997,  p.  61).  Any adult  living  in  Czechoslovakia  could  buy a  book of
vouchers  for  a  relatively small  fee,  34 US dollars,  obtaining  a  thousand of  investment
points,  which  could  be  directly  used  to  bid  for  shares  or  transferred  to  investment
privatisation funds to bid for the shares on their behalf (Gupta et al., 2008). During the first
wave of voucher privatisation, they were trusted by two-thirds of the participating public
(World Bank, 1999). Moreover, the government held about 20-25% shares during the first
wave, some of them were preserved in order to meet the restitution claims, the rest was
traded during the second wave. Czechoslovakia designed a clear and comprehensive system
of voucher privatisation not only for reaching a “fair” distribution of state property, but also
to gain a large public support, ensuring that previous  nomenklatura will not be enriched,
and, thus, fasten the process (Gupta et al., 2008). Indeed, public concerns only stimulated
the public interest both in the Czech and Slovak parts in learning about investment and risk-
taking,  and by the  beginning of  1992 already  8.7  million  of  Czechoslovakia’s  citizens
exercised their opportunity to buy voucher books (Goldman, 1999).
Despite  the  similar  design  of  privatisation  process,  initiated  in  former  Czechoslovakia,
there was the difference between the practical implementation in Czech and Slovak lands.
Gupta et al. (2008) noted that the Czech Republic inherited the most profitable and efficient
enterprises  in  the  country,  and  the  privatisation  process  was  mostly  concentrated  on
redistributing their shares with the population.
Since Slovakia’s part  of the country hosted mostly small  state firms or large inefficient
armament  enterprises,  its  population  raised  some  concerns  about  the  “fairness”  of  the
privatisation. Slovak lands also suffered from higher unemployment rate. Moreover, since
the  process  was  conducted  by  Prague  government,  there  was  suspicion  that  the  initial
system design was supposed to benefit Czech people more. These somewhat more modest
support in the “fairness” of the system is considered by scholars as the main factor slowing
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down the privatisation process.  However,  already in 1992 the privatisation scheme was
implemented  (Goldman, 1999).
Both  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republic  prioritised  a  voucher  system  and  the  countries’
population  was  highly  concerned  about  the  “fairness”  of  the  process  and  wanted  the
government to take over the process and provide the people with both administrative and
educative support. However, privatisation in the Czech Republic initially obtained a larger
public support and concentrated on redistribution of the more profitable enterprises shares,
therefore, speeding up the process. Slovak people had somewhat more doubts, also due to
the inheritance of small or highly inefficient enterprises, and, thus, the process took off one
year later, slowing down the speed of privatisation.
4.3.2. Diversified experience of the Baltic States: Estonia as the first and fastest to
privatise
The  Baltic  States  had  already  partially  started  privatisation  under  the  Soviet  umbrella.
Estonia was the first one to initiate the process, largely due to the fact that the country was
not that much “over-industrialised” and hosted the most profitable enterprises compared to
its  neighbours.  Such  conditions  generally  enabled  the  government  to  initiate  fast,  “big
bang” type of economic reforms, privatisation included (Norkus, 2011).  Furthermore, due
to the low efficiency of ex-Soviet enterprises, a large share of them could not function in
the new capitalist order, thus, a significant number of workers lost their jobs during the first
years of transition, especially in the case of Latvia (Terk & Reid, 2011).
The most suitable option for fast privatisation was to sell the enterprises with the means of
direct sales or investment tenders, also to foreigners. A relatively developed banking system
also was able to provide guarantees to the buyers. Initially, though, there was debate both
within  the  government  and  the  public  about  which  type  of  privatisation  to  adopt,  the
voucher system was also considered as an option and was even partially implemented, but
still direct sales played the dominant role (Terk & Reid, 2011).
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Latvian  communist  heritage  was  not  as  favourable  as  the  Estonian  one:  large  military
enterprises,  that  were  essential  for  Soviet  central  planned  economy,  turned  out  to  be
technologically  out-dated when the iron curtain fell,  having low chances of survival  in
market economy conditions (Norkus, 2011). Another problem was that the politicians were
not sure which privatisation model to follow. Declaring to implement a voucher system
first, from 1994 Latvia switched to direct sales model. However, by coincidence, at that
time Latvia experienced a banking crisis, that reduced the role of financial institutions in
the privatisation process and, consequently, could not provide the buyers with guarantees
(Terk & Reid, 2011).
The  Lithuanian  government  decided  to  undertake  a  more  gradual  approach  towards
privatisation and in the first years prioritised a voucher system, which mostly benefited the
insiders and did not require the intervention of banks, that were much underdeveloped in
the  beginning  of  1990s.  The  scholars  also  underlined  that  the  system  itself  was  not
thoroughly designed, but helped to speed up the process, reaching the peak already in 1993
(Terk & Reid, 2011).
However, against the background of hyperinflation, the full implementation of the reforms
was postponed, but that did not mean slowing down privatisation process. According to
Norkus  (2011),  such  a  situation  created  clear  winners  of  the  reforms,  who abused the
uncertainty of the situation and the lack of proper legal framework in order to seek rent.
The scholar also noted that the first elections in a sovereign Lithuania were won by the ex-
communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and, therefore, the privatisation process
was considered as benefiting the political elite, who had an easier access to information
about  the  assets  as  compared  to  regular  citizens.  Terk  and  Reid  (2011)  added  that
privatisation in Lithuania also relatively benefited the employees of the enterprises, and
these advantages only increased with time.
In 1995, Lithuania switched to direct sales method, and this significantly reduced the speed
of privatisation (Terk & Reid, 2011).
The  Baltic  States  started  partially  privatising  state  enterprises  even  before  gaining
independence. The year of 1991 gave the countries full autonomy to conduct the desired
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reforms, and in the end, the role of the state in case of all three countries was reduced
almost to zero.
Estonia was the first and the fastest to start the reforms, prioritising direct sales method,
including sales to foreigners. The enterprises potential was the most promising among the
Baltic States, which attracted the attention of investors. Latvia for the first three years used
a voucher system model, but then switched to direct sales. The enterprises put on sale were
low  efficient  and  lost  their  essential  role  after  the  collapse  of  central  planned  Soviet
economy,  thus,  were  not  that  investment  attractive.  Lithuania,  like  Latvia,  first  was  a
proponent  of  gradual  reforms and prioritised a  voucher  system. However,  unfavourable
macroeconomic situation forced the government to postpone the full implementation of the
reforms, which created a window of opportunities for a rent-seeking behaviour, benefiting a
smaller part of population. Moreover, the political elite and enterprise employees were in a
better position due to the access of the firms information. In 1995, the government also
adopted direct sales method of privatisation, following its neighbours.
4.3.3. Privatisation and income inequality dynamics: economic success and inefficient
firm legacy fostering unequal income distribution
The  main  difference  between  the  groups  of  the  countries  lies  in  the  type  of  main
privatisation  method  and  the  role  of  the  government  during  the  early  years  that  were
characterised by massive privatisation. The Czech and Slovak Republics adopted voucher
system and to less extent used direct sales, Latvia and Lithuania followed the same path
before 1994 and 1995 respectively, Estonia largely relied on direct sales. Czechoslovakia
and  later  on  the  Czech  and  Slovak  government  actively  participated  in  the  process,
providing its  citizens  with administrative and educative support,  while  the Baltic  states
lacked institutional framework for that or relied almost entirely on market forces.
There is also a difference within the countries’ groups. The Czech Republic inherited more
profitable and efficient enterprises, that were more attractive for investment, which resulted
in a higher increase of income inequality, while Slovak lands hosted mostly either small
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enterprises, or large armament that lost their importance, and in the end did not cause great
changes in income distribution. The Baltic States generally inherited less efficient firms as
compared to the Czech or Slovak Republics, thus a large share of workers lost their jobs
and thus wages when de-industrialisation started. Estonia, if compared with its neighbours,
although inherited the most compatible enterprises and, while reaching relative economic
success,  largely  failed  in  mitigating  the  rise  of  income  inequality.  Lithuania,  whose
enterprises were also relatively profitable, failed to provide a “fair” privatisation system,
that  benefited  only  particular  groups  of  population,  which  resulted  in  somewhat  rapid
increase in income inequality. Latvia was in a similar situation with Slovakia, that had to
privatise the most inefficient enterprises of the region, that in the end slowed down the
process of privatisation itself and restrained to some extent the rise in the Gini coefficient,
most probably due to the lower returns on such capital.
4.4. Taxation impact: different revenues from capital income, similar burden borne by
consumers
4.4.1. Eagerness to implement neoliberal policies: taxation strategy overview
Shifting  towards  free  market  implied  increasing  the  international  competitiveness  and
attraction  of  foreign  capital.  All  the  post-communist  countries  set  liberalisation  of  the
economy as the highest priority, which caused quite similar policy sets implementations.
Regardless of the left/right economic division of the governments in charge, neoliberal, or
“Avant-guard”, policies were supported not only by political elites, but also by populations.
There is a common trend among all the transition countries in Europe, especially in the new
EU member states that were eager to increase their competitiveness as compared to other,
‘older’ EU members: at some point, like a domino effect, they implemented flat tax rates on
both  personal  and  corporate  income,  which  later  was  supported  by  international
organisations. Moreover, the corporate profits income tax was cut to the lowest percentage
83
in the world.  The latter  policy, though, caused other EU members discontent (Appel &
Orenstein, 2018).
However, the flat tax rate, that bears regressive nature, was adopted by the countries of
studies in different periods of time. Before the reforms, all of the countries had progressive
taxation on personal income. The range of rates varied from a country to country. Czech
Republic and Slovakia used to have five income brackets, and in the former case the rate
fluctuated between 15% and 40% (Bronchi & Burns, 2001), in the latter one – 10% to 38%
(OECD, 2008). Estonia had three income brackets with the rates range of 16%-33%, Latvia
– five, ranging from 15%-35%, Lithuania’s rates were 18-33% (Stepanyan, 2003).
The Baltic states were one of the first to implement a flat tax rate for personal income.
Estonia and Lithuania introduced it in 1994 – of 26% and 33% respectively (Stepanyan,
2003). Latvia followed its neighbours a couple of years after, in 1997, and introduced a
single rate on personal income at 25% (Adhikari & Alm, 2013). Slovakia adopted a flat rate
in 2004 at 19%, the Czech Republic was the last one, who imposed the flat tax rate in 2008
at 15% (Appel & Orenstein, 2018).
The tax on capital profits was flat and relatively high from the very beginning in Czech
Republic and Slovakia, where it constituted 45% (Bonker, 2006) and 40% (Remeta et al.,
2015).  Among  the  Baltic  States,  only  Lithuania  imposed  a  flat  rate  as  soon  as  it  got
independence, but at a lower rate compared to the Czech and Slovak Republics – 29% up to
2000. Progressive taxation of corporate profit income was in force in Estonia during the
first year of independence, varying from 25% to 35%, and in Latvia for the first two years,
the rate constituted from 15 to 35% (Stepanyan, 2003).
Value added tax, the main source of consumption taxation, was the one that underwent the
biggest number of changes within the time. The Czech Republic and Slovakia always had
the group of goods that had reduction in taxation: the standard rate varied between 19 and
25% within the time, while reduced rate started to slowly grow from 2008 in case of the
Czech Republic and already in 1999 in case of Slovakia. It should be noted though, that
when implementing the flat tax rate system, Slovakia abolished also the reductions of VAT
for three years (European Commission, 2018).
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The Baltic States standard VAT rate in the beginning was somewhat smaller than in the
Czech and Slovak Republics before 2010s, varying from 10 to 19%. However, up to the
2000s, the countries did not have a reduced VAT rate, with the exception of Lithuania, that
implemented it at 9% level in 1994 and kept till 1997.
In the end, all of the countries adopted a flat tax rate system on personal and corporate
incomes, which was found to have a regressive nature in practice (ECB, 2007). However,
the Czech and Slovak Republics did it  later than the Baltic States, keeping progressive
taxation for a longer period. The larger tax burden on high-income households and high-
profit  corporations,  together with a differentiated VAT tax could have slowed down the
growth of income inequality during the period of the 1990s until the 2000s in case of the
Czech and Slovak Republics. The Baltic States, which established relatively low fixed rates
on corporate profits and introduced the flat tax rates on personal income almost ten years
earlier than the Czech and Slovak Republics, were likely to limit the government revenue
from capital and high-income households and, thus, to expose the most vulnerable parts of
population to rapid market liberalisation process, and this in turn resulted in a faster income
inequality increase.
4.4.2.  Biggest  tax  burden  carried  by  labour  force:  country  case  analysis  of  tax
revenues by economic function
Tax ratios analysis contributes to the assessment of tax systems because it is more likely to
reflect the real impact of the tax rates imposed on the government revenue, and somewhat
mitigates the possible effect of tax evasion and tax exemptions exercised by tax payers.
As discussed in Chapter One, the evidence of OECD countries (Iosifidi & Mylonidis, 2017)
showed that the greater reliance on labour and consumption taxation relatively to capital
one in total tax revenue leads to the increase of income inequality, whilst greater reliance on
labour tax revenue over consumption one is likely to improve income inequality situation.
Figures 28-32 represent the tax ratios for the countries of study plotted against income
inequality levels, supported by the Table 2 with author’s calculations (cf. Appendix 4).
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In the Czech Republic, the labour taxpayers carried higher tax burden relative to capital
ones during the whole period of data coverage. The ratio was increasing throughout the
years. If from 1995 to 2007 it was fluctuating between 2.3-2.7, after 2007 it grew up to 3.3
in 2010 by decreasing the revenue from capital taxes, and since then the situation has not
changed too much.
Consumption/capital ratio was lower than labour/capital – it was fluctuating between 1.4
and 2.4,  but  followed a similar  trend,  rising and dropping in  the same years  when the
consumption/capital one, again, at the expense of consumption taxes.
Labour/consumption tax ratio was always at least 1.4, meaning that consumers carried a
smaller burden compared to the labour force. The highest ratios were recorded for the years
2006-2008 – almost 1.8, and in 2009 the Czech Republic experienced a drop in the Gini
coefficient  by 0.6%. Labour/consumption tax ratio  was higher than consumption/capital
one from 2001 until 2007, meaning that the labour force tax burden was increased in order
to protect consumers.
The Slovakian government relied on the labour taxes the most, especially in relation to
capital.  Consumers  were  relatively  protected  – labour/consumption  tax  ratio  within  the
years increased by 60%, meaning the improvement of the consumer situation.
Labour/capital tax ratio was always higher than consumption/capital. If from 1999 to 2003
the difference between the ratios  constituted about  0.4 points,  from 2004 the gap kept
increasing and arrived at a mark of about 1.5, meaning the increase of tax burden carried by
consumers relatively to capital tax payers, whose share in the governmental revenue was
slightly  decreasing  over  the  time.  The  changes  in  tax  revenues  from  labour  and
consumption taxes relative to capital were associated with the changes in income inequality
for the years 2009-2013.
In the case of Estonia, labour/capital tax ratio was always higher than consumption/capital
and followed the same path, keeping the distance between the ratios at about the same level
– 2.5. Capital tax share in total tax revenue was only reducing over the time. From 1995 to
2005  and  from 2008  until  2011,  positive  and  negative  changes  in  the  tax  ratios  were
associated with rises and falls of the Gini coefficient.
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Labour tax revenue in Estonia was always higher than consumption. However, the ratio did
not change dramatically over time, taking the values from 1.17 in 2006 and 1.8 in 1999.
In Latvia, the tax burden of the labour force was also somewhat higher than consumers’ one
relatively to capital. Labour/capital and consumption/capital ratios were following the same
trend during the whole period of study. The tax revenue from labour and consumption taxes
relative to capital were the highest in 2000, 2003 and 2010; capital was taxed a bit heavier
as compared to other years in 1999, 2001, and 2008.
Labour taxes constituted about 1.2-1.4 times higher revenue that consumption ones. The
lowest burden of labour taxpayers as compared to consumption was in the years of 1998,
2005-2006, and 2014; the highest – in 2000-2002 and 2008-2010.
However, none of the changes in tax ratios can be clearly associated with the dynamics of
the  Gini  coefficient:  income inequality  was  slightly  growing with  the  years,  while  tax
revenue composition went through a number of changes.
In Lithuania, the labour force and consumers were taxed much higher than the capital in the
years of 2000-2002, the ratios reaching almost 9 and 7 points respectively. After that, the
labour/capital  and consumption/capital  tax  ratios  fell  down to  2.2-3.8  point  due  to  the
increase  of  capital  tax  revenue  in  total  revenue,  labour  still  being  taxed  more  than
consumers.
As relative to consumption, labour taxes always constituted a bigger share of tax revenue,
but the difference was rather small: 1.1-1.4 times larger.
The expected positive correlation between labour/capital and consumption/capital ratio and
income inequality was only partially supported by the empirical evidence in the countries
of  study.  In  the  case  of  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics,  the  decrease  of  labour  and
consumption  taxes  revenue  might  have  helped  to  prevent  dramatic  growth  of  income
inequality in the years of 2001-2008 and 2008-2013 respectively. In Estonia, higher tax
burden  of  both  labour  and  consumption  relatively  to  capital  is  associated  with
corresponding changes in the Gini coefficient during almost all the time of study.
87
In the Latvian case the dynamics of qualitative changes  in tax system design were not
associated with the dynamics of the Gini coefficient. In case of Lithuania, the correlation
was found to be the opposite to the one expected.
4.4.3.  Same tax system design,  different  degree of  reliance on capital  taxes:  cross-
country overview
Figures 14-16 represent the evolution of each tax ratio in the countries of study.
The Czech and Slovak Republics never imposed such a heavy tax burden to labour relative
to capital in comparison with the Baltic States during the whole period of the data available.
Figure 14. Labour/capital tax ratio, by country, 1995-2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data
The labour/capital tax ratio in the Czech and Slovak Republic never exceeded 4 points.
Compared to the Baltic States, the trends in the countries were rather similar, Slovakia over
a period of time imposed more pressure on labour taxes, especially during 2003-2007 and
2009-2013 years.
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The Baltic States collected a 2-4 times bigger revenue of labour taxes relatively to capital
one as compared to the Czech and Slovak Republics. The lowest ratios were recorded for
the years 1997-1998 for Estonia and Latvia, and for 2006-2008 for Latvia and Lithuania.
Such changes happened due to  the increase of capital  tax share in the revenue that on
average was relatively lower. The highest increase of the ratio took place in 2001 in the
case of Estonia and Lithuania and in 2010 in the case of Estonia and Latvia, again, due to
relative rapid drops in the capital tax share in the revenue.
Estonia,  with  the  exception  of  2001-2002,  collected  the  biggest  share  of  labour  taxes
relatively to capital ones among all the countries, with the ratio fluctuating between 4.4 in
1997 and 7.8 in 2011. The share of capital  tax in revenue as a percentage of GDP on
average constituted 2.5-4%.
Figure 15. Consumption/capital tax ratio, by country, 1995-2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data
Lithuania outperformed Estonia only in 2001-2002, reaching extremely high, the highest
for all of the countries of studies, ratio of labour to capital income – 8.6. From 2004 to
2008, Lithuania followed the path of Slovakia, from 2009 to 2014 – the one of the Czech
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Republic. The change of trend happened mostly due to the increased revenues from capital
taxes.
Latvia on average imposed a smaller burden on labour relatively to capital taxes compared
to its neighbours. The ratio rose in 1996, 2000, and 2003 at the level of 4.6-4.7, and in
2010, hitting the mark of 5.9. In 2004-2008, the dynamics of Latvia’s labour/capital ratio
was similar to the one of Lithuania, from 2011 till 2013 it went in line with the one of
Slovakia, because the country started to receive a somewhat bigger revenue from capital
taxes.
Consumption/capital tax ratio followed approximately the same path of labour/capital in all
the countries of study, with a slight difference between its behaviour in the Czech Republic,
where it took relatively lower values than the one of Slovakia. This means that the countries
increased or decreased the tax burden of labour and consumption relatively to capital rather
simultaneously, while in case of the Czech Republic the government did it to a slighter less
extent.
Figure 16. Labour/consumption tax ratio, by country, 1995-2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data
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Labour  taxes  constituted  a  larger  part  than  consumption  one  in  all  the  countries’ tax
revenue.
Consumers were protected in the Czech Republic the most – labour taxes revenue was 1.5-
1.8  times  higher  than  the  consumption  ones.  During  1999-2003,  they  were  the  least
protected  in  Slovakia,  where  the  share  of  labour  taxes  was  only  20% larger  than  the
consumption ones.
The labour/consumption ratio was kept at a relatively low level in case of the Baltic States
with the exception of Estonia before 2004, when the labour taxes revenue was 60-80%
larger than the one of consumption taxes. The lowest tax burden relatively to consumption
one was recorded for all the Baltic States in 2004-2007 and 2010-2014.
4.4.4. Regressive taxation, different proportions of capital taxes revenue: summary of
findings
Regardless of the economic orientation of governments, in the end all of the countries of
study implemented the flat tax system, that was found to have regressive nature. The Baltic
States were the first ones, fixing the tax rates already during the first years of transition,
capital  ones  at  a  lower  level.  The Czech and Slovak Republics  implemented the same
system 10-14 years later, thus keeping progressive taxation of personal income for a longer
period, as well as imposing a heavier taxing on capital even at flat rates in the early years.
The tax systems design in all the countries of study is rather similar: the government relies
the most on labour tax revenues both relatively to consumption and capital taxes. Most of
the tax ratio dynamics do not clearly resemble the trends in the Gini coefficient, meaning
that it is quite likely that changes in taxation cannot cause immediate changes. There is only
one period of time when there was a clear difference in the group of countries dynamics.
After 2008, all of the countries experienced the increase of consumption/capital ratio, to
different extent though, but in case of the Czech and Slovak Republic, unlike in the Baltic
States, at the same time labour/consumption ratio was kept at a relatively high value. In
other words, the decrease of capital taxes revenue was done more at the expense of labour
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taxes rather than consumption ones, that might have prevented income distribution from
rapid changes in the case of the Czech and Slovak Republics, as compared to the Baltic
States, whose Gini coefficient after 2008 underwent through rapid swinging changes.
On average, the Czech and Slovak Republics always collected a greater share of capital
taxes as compared to the Baltic States, and their labour/capital  and consumption/capital
ratios were considerably lower than in the Baltic States. Thus, it is quite likely that different
degree of reliance on capital taxes – to a larger extent in the Czech and Slovak Republics
and to  a  much smaller  extent  in  the  Baltic  states  –  has  a  mitigating  effect  on income
inequality and prevents the Gini coefficient from rapid changes.
4.5. Benefits distribution and universality of welfare
4.5.1. Cash benefits expenditures: less generous Baltic States
The  last  initial  component  of  a  household  income  is  the  amount  of  cash  benefits  its
members  receive.  After  tax  deduction,  cash  transfers  are  supposed  to  regulate  income
distribution.
Figure 17 demonstrates the amount of cash transferred to the targeted households in the
countries of study. Figure 33 illustrates the GDP dynamics over the same years to control
for the nominal value of cash transfers (cf. Appendix 5).
Overall,  the  Czech and Slovak Republics  spend bigger  share  of  their  revenue on cash
benefits as compared to the Baltic States. Slovakia spends somewhat more – 12-14% of its
GDP, while Czech Republic transfers about 10.5-13% of their GDP to the households in
need.  The  Baltic  States  expenditures  go  in  line  to  some extent  and largely  depend  on
macroeconomic situation. Normally their cash benefits transfers constitute 6-10% of GDP,
while in times of crises, that took place in 1999 (so called Russian crisis) and in 2008-2010,
the share went up to 13% or even 16% in case of Lithuania.
When general GDP dynamics are taken into account, the Czech government turns out to
have more generous welfare – while spending a smaller share of GDP on cash benefits,
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their  GDP as such is on average 100 billions US dollars per year more than of Slovak
Republic. In the case of the Baltic States, the Lithuanian welfare state seems to be more
generous since its GDP is higher by about 30 billion US dollars, as well as its share spent
on cash transfers.  Latvia’s  GDP is  insignificantly  larger  –  by  7-10 billion  U.S.  dollars
(USD) than Estonia’s one, but the former’s cash transfers after 2004 constituted less of a
percentage of GDP than of the latter one.
Figure 17. Cash transfers expenditures, by country, 1995-2014
Source: OECD
Among the Baltic States, the most generous in terms of cash benefits was Latvia, which
spent on average 2% more of its GDP on benefits transfers. After 2002, Latvia reached the
same mark as Estonia, and kept reducing its benefits share, hitting in 2007 the lowest mark
for all of the countries of study – 7%. By 2009, cash benefits constituted 13%, which was
still the lowest share among the countries. By 2014, the Latvian government had reduced
the share of cash benefits at 10.2% level.
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Estonia from 1997 to 2003 had the lowest share of cash benefits, even during the Russian
crisis the expenditures were increased only by 1%, when its neighbours increased them by
2%. From 2004 until 2014, Estonia’s cash benefits share of GDP was somewhat between
Latvia and Lithuania’s indicators.
Lithuania, from 2001 was found to be the most generous in terms of cash benefits, spending
about 0.5% of its GDP more than Estonia, and about 1% more than Latvia. The Lithuanian
response to the macroeconomic crisis of 2008-2010 resulted in the highest amount of cash
benefits constituting 16% of the country’s GDP.
The GDP was constantly rising in all the countries of study, with the exception of the year
2009, when all of them lost about 1-9 billion USD as compared to 2008.
Lithuania experienced the biggest lost in nominal values, and at the same time the share of
its benefits expenditures from GDP constituted the highest values among the countries of
study. Estonia’s loss in GDP was somewhat less than in Latvia, but Estonia in the same year
spent a larger share of its GDP to provide households with cash benefits. The Czech and
Slovak Republics did not suffer such huge losses, but at  the same time also somewhat
increased the share of cash benefits. Thus, it seems that all the countries, but especially the
Baltic States, spent a larger share of GDP on cash benefits, but somewhat the same amount
in nominal values during the crisis of 2008. Unlike the Russian crisis of 1999, when the
Baltic States increased their cash benefits expenditures against a background of slow but
stable GDP growth.
For the rest of the years, when GDP was growing, the increase of benefits expenditures
taken as a GDP share that was evident in the years of 2005-2008, actually meant preserving
approximately the same amount in nominal values. After 2009, when the macroeconomic
situation stabilised, the Czech and Slovak Republic only increased the share of GDP spent
on benefits, while the Baltic States drastically decreased it, preserving somewhat the same
nominal value. 
The main difference between the two groups of countries lies in the dynamics  of cash
transfers.  The Czech Republic  and Slovakia  generally  spent  larger  share of  their  GDP,
regardless the macroeconomic conditions. The Baltic States normally spent a lower share,
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increasing the share of cash benefits only during times of crises that largely resulted in the
relatively same amount of cash transfers in nominal value. Thus, it can be concluded that
the Czech Republic had the most generous system of cash benefits, followed by Slovakia.
The Baltic States, on the contrary, spent a smaller share of their GDP on cash benefits,
given that their GDP rates are significantly lower than the one of the Czech and Slovak
Republics.
4.5.2. The matter of targeting: welfare policies analysis
As discussed in Chapter One, the evidence from OECD countries show that not only the
generosity of welfare state matters in income distribution, but the success of governmental
programmes in targeting those in need.
Figure 18 represents the types of welfare policies in the countries of study. It clearly shows
that  on average  the  Czech Republic  and Slovakia  exercise  more  means-tested  policies,
meaning  that  their  welfare  programmes  largely  benefit  those  in  need,  the  room  for
universalistic policies is also left though.
The Baltic states, on the contrary, give more preference in their governmental expenditures
to the programmes that potentially can benefit any member of the society, like healthcare
and education. However, Latvia stands a bit different from its neighbours: before 2005, its
governmental policies were more targeted and means-tested than the ones of Estonia and
Lithuania.
Slovakia almost did not change its approach to welfare policies within the time, paying
only  slighter  bigger  attention  to  universalistic  programmes  in  2011-2012.  The  Czech
Republic used to be more universally oriented than Slovakia until 2000. From 2001-2009,
the country somewhat increased the number of its means-tested policies. From 2010, the
trend  had  reversed:  the  Czech  Republic  started  to  move  towards  universalistic  policy
direction, by 2013 even outperforming Lithuania.
Estonia was found to have the most universalistic policies among the countries throughout
the time of study, and changed its approach towards somewhat larger number of means-
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tested policies in 2008. In 2012, like the Czech Republic, Estonia increased the number of
its universalistic welfare policies again.
Figure 18. Type of welfare policies, by country, 1990-2014
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database
Lithuania  was performing quite  similar  to  Estonia,  shifting  more  towards  means-tested
system a bit  earlier though – in 2003. Unlike most of the countries of study, Lithuania
concentrated its welfare programmes on a means-tested basis even more in 2013.
Latvia’s  welfare  policy  type  during  the  years  has  changed  the  most.  Before  1994,  its
welfare policies design was close to the Czech Republic’s one, after that until 2000 Latvia
was  more  concentrated  on  means-tested  approach.  In  2001,  the  share  of  universalistic
policies increased, and the welfare policies design again looked somewhat similar to the
Czech one.  In 2005, Latvian policymakers became more concerned about universalistic
policies, and the country performed somewhat similar to Lithuania. Unlike other countries
of study, Latvia did not change its policy approach in 2013.
The  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics’ welfare  programmes  design  on  average  was  more
concentrated on those in need, while the Baltic States preferred to invest in universalistic
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policies that can potentially benefit any member of the society. Latvia during 1990-2004
rather followed Czech and Slovak trends, and in 2005 changed the focus of its policies on a
more universalistic one, following the trend of other Baltic States.
4.5.3. Welfare state and income inequality: generous and targeted benefits keep Gini
coefficient at a lower mark
The Gini coefficient is plotted against welfare expenditures for every country on figures 34-
38 (cf. Appendix 5).
In the case of the Czech Republic, it does not reveal an expected correlation between the
variables of interest. Neither the change of focus on more universalistic or means-tested
welfare policies is associated with allegedly corresponding increases or decreases in the
Gini coefficient.
Cash  transfers  are  not  associated  with  the  dynamics  of  income distribution  in  case  of
Slovakia either. When the government cut the expenditures on social benefits in 2003-2008
against relatively fast growth of GDP, the Gini coefficient went up, and then had already
dropped by 2008. The type of welfare programmes were also stable in Slovakia,  while
income distribution situation was changing.
The expected correlation between the variables in case of Estonia was not found during the
majority of this period, with the exception of 2010-2014, when gradual decrease in cash
benefits expenditures along with faster GDP growth is associated with a rise of the Gini
coefficient. Although, the welfare programmes type change in 2008 towards a more means-
tested basis can be one of the reasons of income inequality decrease, as well as the shift
back towards more universalistic approach in 2013, might have partially resulted in the
Gini coefficient rise.
In the case of Latvia, the gradual decrease of cash benefits amount was associated with the
rise  of  income inequality  in  the  period  of  1999-2006,  as  well  as  the  increase  of  cash
transfers might have partially resulted in slight improvement of income inequality situation
by 2011. As for the welfare policies, Latvia was gradually shifting towards means-tested
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approach before 1999, but it  did not result  into the drop of the Gini coefficient.  When
choosing a slightly more universalistic approach, the Latvian government kept cutting the
share  of  cash  benefits  when  GDP growth  was  slowing  down,  that  went  along  with
continuous increase of income inequality. In 2005, the welfare policies moved closer to the
universalistic approach again and, along with the cut of benefits expenditures share, might
have resulted in a rapid rise of the Gini in 2006.
The dynamics of income distribution is not correlated with the cash transfers spending in
case of Lithuania – the highest share of 16% of GDP in 2009 is associated with the decrease
of GDP and one of the highest values of the Gini coefficient – about 37%. However, the
shift to more means-tested policies in 2004 given the continuous growth of GDP resulted in
a sharp decrease of income inequality  the following years.  On the other  hand,  moving
towards means-tested welfare policies even more in 2013 is associated with a rapid increase
in the Gini coefficient.
4.5.4. Cash benefits and welfare policies: long-term effect
The changes in the cash benefits expenditures most of the time were not associated with the
dynamics of the Gini coefficient in the countries of study. The alleged correspondence was
found only in case of Estonia, where in 2010-2014 the cash benefits were shrinking and
income inequality was growing, and in case of Latvia, where the government was gradually
cutting the share of cash benefits  expenditures against  the background of a  rising Gini
coefficient.
Changes in welfare programmes approach did not also result into immediate changes with
the income distribution situation in the countries of study. Only in the case of Estonia,
shifting towards more means-tested approach in 2008, might have contributed to a more
equal income distribution, as well as the reverse situation in 2013 might have been the
cause in the Gini coefficient's upwards leap. Lithuania seems to be the most affected by the
change of welfare policies focus: in the years when the government implemented a more
means-tested approach in 2004, the income inequality situation significantly improved.
98
Nevertheless, the evidence from the countries of study does not allow us to make solid
conclusions about cash benefits expenditures and type of welfare policies in the short run.
However, such particularities as a generally more generous welfare state and means-tested
welfare policies approach in  case of the Czech and Slovak Republics seem to mitigate
income inequality situation and prevent it from dramatic changes, rather than periodical
changes in cash transfers share and welfare policies approach of the Baltic states, that seem
only to contribute to the average level of income inequality.
4.6. Provisional conclusions: policies matter in a long run
In this chapter, the effect of national policies, including workers wage bargaining power,
privatisation, taxation and benefits distribution were analysed.
Worker unions were constantly losing their members throughout the whole period of study
in  all  of  the  countries,  ending  at  rather  the  same  low  level  by  2013.  The  bargaining
coverage  rate  was  also  constantly  falling.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  Baltic  States  it
decreased to a relatively larger degree. Thus, it might be noted that even small but relatively
more powerful worker unions in the Czech and Slovak Republics managed to preserve the
wages of workers at a better level than in case of the Baltic states in a long run. Although,
the effect should not be overestimated due to the fact that lately, in 2011-2013, Slovakia’s
worker unions were losing power, but income inequality kept slightly falling.
Privatisation  policies  implementation  explain  the  difference  in  the  speed  of  income
inequality increase in the beginning of 1990s in all the countries. The Czech and Slovak
Republic, that provided their population with broad governmental support, experienced 5-
7% rise of Gini coefficient by 1996. The Baltic States that either relied entirely on market
forces and banks as Estonia or failed to establish a legal framework for “fair” privatisation,
by the same year of 1996 experienced the increase of income inequality by 6-12%. At the
same time, the analysis of privatisation process revealed that Slovakia and Latvia, due to
lower speed of privatisation and lower efficiency of their enterprises, experienced a slower
increase of the Gini. Furthermore, the Baltic States generally inherited low-efficient firms,
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Latvia to a bigger extent though, and thus a number of workers in the region lost their jobs
during transition period.
Taxation design established in the countries was found rather similar in all the states, that
relied on labour taxes to a greater extent as compare to both consumption and capital ones,
although favouring capital tax payers. Changes in the shares of tax revenues by economic
function  generally  was  not  found  significant  in  a  short  run.  However,  the  principle
difference lies in the degree on capital taxes reliance of the state: the share of capital taxes
in the Baltic States was multiple times less than in the Czech and Slovak Republic. Thus,
the Baltic States relatively failed to obtain revenue from capital, and such taxation policy
favouring  capital,  not  labour  or  consumers,  only  contributes  to  higher  rates  of  income
inequality.
Welfare  expenditures  expressed  in  cash  benefits  that  are  distributed  directly  to  the
households in need was not found to have a significant effect on income inequality in the
short term apart from a couple of exceptional cases among the Baltic States. However, the
Czech and Slovak Republic generally were more generous in cash benefits, while the Baltic
States’ governments kept the average amount smaller, that in the long run influence the
income inequality situation.
Welfare policies of the Baltic states were more universalistic during the most period of time
as compared to the Czech and Slovak Republics, that preferred to pay more attention to
targeting those in need. Latvia stands out as an exceptional case that first,  before 2004,
focused its  policies  on means-tested  benefits  more,  although it  did not  prevent  income
inequality from continuous growth.
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Summary and conclusions
When  going  through  transition,  the  countries  prioritised  economic  efficiency  and  the
attraction of foreign capital, often failing to provide the population with social safety nets.
Neoliberal policies were adopted by the majority of the transition countries, regardless of
the political orientation of the governments in charge.
The data especially on the late communist years and first years of independence is rather
scarce and, thus, only rather approximate estimations are available. Moreover, literature on
the topic shows that income inequality is rising everywhere in the world, meaning that a
number of  processes,  including global  ones,  take place  simultaneously  and are hard to
separate from the outcomes of national governments decisions. Scholars debated about the
causes of rising income inequality, naming urbanisation, rising share of capital, weakening
power  of  worker  unions,  open trade,  foreign  direct  investment,  and price  liberalisation
particularly in the case of transition countries. Generally stimulating Gini coefficient rise,
these processes  had their  influence on the countries  to  different  extent.  Thus,  literature
proposed to look at particular cases separately in order to capture the complexity of the
processes, take into account national policies, and thus outline possible causes.
The case of transition countries implies methodological restrictions. All the data that covers
pre-transition and first years of transition was derived from the surveys that lacked unified
design  and  thus  imposed  constraints  on  cross-country  and  across  time  comparisons.
However, the differences in estimations, even though sometimes relatively different, did not
prevent from plotting the trend lines for each country.
The study analysed the income inequality trends in two group of countries: the Czech and
Slovak Republic, that under communism were ruled by the united governance of Prague,
and the Baltic states, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, that operated under Moscow
regulations. If preserving similar, relatively low income inequality levels under the Soviet
umbrella, as soon as the countries acquired independence, the dynamics of Gini coefficients
became rather different.
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This  thesis  contributed  to  collecting  statistical  data  from  various  sources  that  used
distinctive  methodological  approaches  and  explaining  the  differences  in  scholars  and
databases estimations of income inequality in the given countries. The research is based on
a comparison of small number of cases with similar preconditions and different outcomes
in terms of Gini coefficients also helped highlight the role of national policies in new EU
member states that lead to dramatically different patterns of income distribution. Moreover,
the  final  results  of  the  research,  even  though  being  limited  to  some  extent,  provide
suggestions for further investigation of the problem.
The overview of statistical data proved that all of the countries of study experienced a rise
in income inequality, the Czech and Slovak Republics – to much smaller extent. The Baltic
States went through two periods of income inequality rise. First one took place in 1990-
1995, at the same time when the Czech and Slovak Republics. The second was noticed
during recent years – 2012-2014. Latvia to some extent can be considered as an outlier
among the Baltic States during the first years of transition – income inequality there was
rising slower, somewhat repeating the Slovak tempo of the Gini growth.
According  to  the  research  results,  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics,  even  though
implementing neoliberal policies along with other transition countries, managed to keep
income inequality at a lower level due to a number of policies. First, the two states provided
vast  governmental  support  to  the population during privatisation process,  which helped
redistribute former national property in a more “fair” way. Secondly, the Czech and Slovak
Republics implemented a regressive flat tax on personal income ten years later than it was
done in the Baltic States, also keeping generally higher tax rates on capital during first 20
years  of  independence.  Thirdly,  the  taxes  on  capital  constitute  a  greater  share  in  total
revenue in the Czech and Slovak Republics as compared to the Baltic States, the latter ones
relying much more strongly on labour and consumption taxes. Finally, the welfare states of
the Czech and Slovak Republics are more generous, and a larger number of their policies
concentrate on cash benefits distribution, that helps improving the situation of the low-
income households.
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During the  research,  some similarities  between Slovakia  and Latvia’ income inequality
trends were also found. With regard to privatisation,  the two countries shared a similar
feature – the process in these countries was slowed down by the greater inefficiency of their
enterprises  as  compared to  their  neighbours.  Taking into  account  also less  incentive  to
obtain  the  shares  of  such enterprises  and lower returns  on  their  capitals,  Slovakia  and
Latvia experienced slower growth of income inequality during 1990-1996 as compared to
their  neighbours.  Moreover,  receiving larger share of capital  taxes in  total  revenue and
reliance  on  bigger  variety  of  cash  benefits  welfare  programmes  before  2000,  explain
Latvia’s slower rate of growing inequality as compared to its neighbours.
Empirical evidence showed that public policies had greater influence on countries’ peculiar
trends of income distribution rather than macroeconomic or demographic indicators.
The  level  of  urbanisation  failed  to  explain  the  differences  between  the  countries:  an
urbanised Czech Republic and a relatively less urban Slovakia performed rather similar in
terms of income inequality trends.
Wage share as opposed to capital share that constitutes household income can only partially
explain  the  existing  differences  between  the  countries  of  study,  being  correlated  with
income inequality level only in some particular periods, or having no correlation with Gini
coefficient at all like in the case of Lithuania.
Unions bargaining power was found to explain the existing difference in income inequality
situations  only  in  a  long  term  run.  Worker  unions  in  all  the  countries  of  study  had
significantly shrunk in size, but the bigger share of the Czech and Slovak workers enjoyed
the wage setting power of collective bargaining agreements,  that  helped them keep the
wages at better level.
Different privatisation paths are strongly associated with income inequality performance.
The Czech and Slovak Republics provided the population with needed bureaucratic and
educational  support,  creating more  “fair  conditions”  for  privatisation.  The Baltic  States
largely relied on market forces, and even when voucher method was used in Latvia and
Lithuania,  the  governments  failed  to  provide  institutional  framework  for  privatisation.
Moreover, de-industrialisation of former Soviet heavy production enterprises proved their
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inefficiency,  that  resulted in high unemployment rates  in the Baltic  States,  to a  greater
extent in Latvia.
Tax system designs in the countries were found to explain income inequality dynamics in
the long run – light taxation of capital inevitably lead to the increase in income inequality.
Although, the Baltic States implemented regressive flat tax systems ten years earlier than
the Czech and Slovak Republics,  the latter  countries also maintained higher capital  tax
rates for a longer period of time. Also, even though all the countries of study collect the
smallest  tax revenue from capital  taxes,  the Baltic States’ revenue is  even smaller,  that
results in larger burden carried by labour and consumption tax payers and results in higher
income inequality.  However,  Latvia’s case stands out from its Baltic neighbours due to
larger reliance on capital income until 2000, which also contributed to slowing down the
growth of income inequality.
Benefits distribution systems of two groups of countries are rather different: on average
spending less, rather universalistic welfare policies are prevalent in the Baltic States. The
Czech and Slovak Republics, on the contrary, allocate a greater share of their GDP to cash
transfers, having rather means-tested approach at the same time. Latvia’s early years of
transition, again, stand separately from its neighbours – the country exercised more means-
tested approach in the beginning of the period of study, which might have contributed to
slowing down the increase of income inequality.
Thus,  governmental  policies,  namely  privatisation,  taxation,  and  benefits  distribution
seemed  to  play  greater  role  in  mitigating  income  inequality  in  the  countries  of  study,
explaining the main differences in countries’ Gini coefficient trends. Macroeconomic and
demographic conditions turned out to have only limited effect on income distribution.
The research gave a general insight to different patterns of income distribution between the
two groups  of  countries  –  the  Czech  and Slovak  Republics  and  the  Baltic  states,  and
reached the goal to explain different paths that countries followed. However, the methods
that were used failed to explain smaller changes of the Gini coefficients in each particular
country. In order to draw more precise conclusions that would explain the differences not
only between the groups of countries, but also within them, governmental policies should
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be  studied  closer  and  in  greater  detail.  Special  attention  should  be  paid  to  benefits
redistribution systems. Another approach that might be implemented in order to investigate
income inequality phenomenon can lie in its decomposition, that will help to reveal the
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Table 1. Income deciles’ ratios, by country, 2004-2014.
Country Decile
ratio
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Czech
Republic
D10/D1 5.55 5.21 5.19 5.14 5.29 5.32 5.32 5.27 5.10 5.24
D5/D1 2.10 2.00 2.00 2.02 2.00 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.00 2.02
D10/D5 2.64 2.61 2.60 2.54 2.64 2.56 2.56 2.54 2.55 2.59
Slovakia D10/D1 6.32 6.62 5.25 5.00 5.62 6.06 6.00 5.64 5.57 6.52
D5/D1 2.53 2.22 2.15 2.20 2.32 2.46 2.46 2.42 2.54 2.61
D10/D5 2.50 2.99 2.44 2.27 2.42 2.47 2.44 2.33 2.19 2.50
Estonia D10/D1 14.74 10.71 9.41 9.25 7.80 7.97 8.14 9.19 9.31 9.46 11.82
D5/D1 3.84 3.21 2.85 2.79 2.73 2.63 2.72 3.04 3.00 3.00 3.41
D10/D5 3.84 3.34 3.30 3.32 2.85 3.03 2.99 3.03 3.10 3.15 3.47
Latvia D10/D1 13.19 14.60 10.88 12.55 13.05 13.25 12.38 11.78 11.35 12.09
D5/D1 3.57 3.55 3.13 3.36 3.57 3.80 3.62 3.26 3.26 3.45
D10/D5 3.69 4.11 3.48 3.73 3.65 3.49 3.42 3.61 3.48 3.50
Lithuania D10/D1 12.36 11.52 10.28 10.48 11.42 14.42 10.61 8.85 10.15 10.68
D5/D1 3.41 3.35 3.08 3.12 3.13 4.00 3.48 2.89 2.96 3.00
D10/D5 3.63 3.44 3.34 3.36 3.65 3.61 3.05 3.06 3.43 3.56
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC survey (Eurostat)
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Figure 19. The share of total national income by bottom income decile (D1), by country, 2004-2014
Source: EU-SILC survey (Eurostat)
Figure 20. The share of total national income by middle-income decile (D5), by country, 2004-2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC survey (Eurostat)
116
Appendix 1 (continued)
Figure 21. The share of total national income by upper income decile (D10), by country, 2004-2014
Source: EU-SILC survey (Eurostat)
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Figure 23. Adjusted wage share and income inequality, the Czech Republic, 1993-2014
Source:  AMECO (Adjusted wage share, %), SWIID 4.0 (Gini coefficient, before 2005), Eurostat
(2005 and after)
Figure 24. Adjusted wage share and income inequality, Slovakia, 1995-2014




Figure 25. Adjusted wage share and income inequality, Estonia, 1993-2014
Source:  AMECO (Adjusted wage share, %), SWIID 4.0 (Gini coefficient, before 2005), Eurostat
(2005 and after)
Figure 26. Adjusted wage share and income inequality, Latvia, 1993-2014




Figure 27. Adjusted wage share and income inequality, Lithuania, 1993-2014
Source:  AMECO (Adjusted wage share, %), SWIID 4.0 (Gini coefficient, before 2005), Eurostat
(2005 and after)
Appendix 4
Table 2. Tax ratios, by country, 1995-2014
Country/year Labour/capital Consumption/capital Labour/Consumption
The Czech Republic
1995 2.25 1.50 1.50
1996 2.70 1.80 1.50
1997 2.60 1.62 1.61
1998 2.67 1.63 1.64
1999 2.52 1.64 1.54
2000 2.63 1.68 1.57
2001 2.39 1.46 1.63
2002 2.44 1.42 1.71
2003 2.36 1.39 1.69
2004 2.61 1.54 1.70
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Country/year Labour/capital Consumption/capital Labour/Consumption
The Czech Republic
2005 2.73 1.61 1.70
2006 2.69 1.51 1.79
2007 2.68 1.53 1.75
2008 2.92 1.68 1.74
2009 2.95 1.89 1.56
2010 3.29 2.08 1.58
2011 3.33 2.27 1.47
2012 3.35 2.35 1.43
2013 3.33 2.37 1.41
2014 3.31 2.21 1.50
Slovakia
1999 2.30 1.90 1.21
2000 2.38 2.25 1.06
2001 2.66 2.20 1.21
2002 2.54 2.23 1.14
2003 2.44 2.20 1.11
2004 3.37 2.50 1.35
2005 3.41 2.70 1.26
2006 3.20 2.43 1.32
2007 3.18 2.43 1.31
2008 3.20 2.24 1.43
2009 3.95 2.63 1.50
2010 3.95 2.62 1.51
2011 4.11 2.81 1.47
2012 3.97 2.45 1.62
2013 3.66 2.18 1.68
2014 3.40 2.08 1.63
Estonia
1995 6.00 3.80 1.58
1996 5.24 3.35 1.56
1997 4.40 2.98 1.48
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Country/year Labour/capital Consumption/capital Labour/Consumption
Estonia
1998 4.55 2.71 1.68
1999 5.50 3.06 1.80
2000 7.24 4.64 1.56
2001 7.25 4.92 1.47
2002 6.29 4.29 1.47
2003 6.03 4.07 1.48
2004 6.00 4.56 1.32
2005 5.85 4.69 1.25
2006 5.81 4.96 1.17
2007 5.57 4.57 1.22
2008 6.37 4.26 1.50
2009 6.70 5.22 1.28
2010 7.70 5.74 1.34
2011 7.81 6.19 1.26
2012 7.00 5.78 1.21
2013 6.23 4.96 1.26
2014 6.35 `5.19 1.22
Latvia
1995 4.49 3.15 1.42
1996 4.76 3.44 1.38
1997 3.98 3.00 1.33
1998 3.71 2.91 1.27
1999 3.79 2.72 1.39
2000 4.59 3.29 1.39
2001 3.87 2.74 1.41
2002 4.26 2.97 1.43
2003 4.74 3.58 1.32
2004 4.34 3.31 1.31
2005 4.03 3.42 1.18
2006 3.75 3.22 1.16
2007 3.44 2.82 1.22
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Country/year Labour/capital Consumption/capital Labour/Consumption
Latvia
2008 3.48 2.48 1.40
2009 5.37 3.74 1.44
2010 5.88 4.28 1.37
2011 4.34 3.38 1.29
2012 3.89 3.06 1.27
2013 3.83 3.11 1.23
2014 3.97 3.31 1.20
Lithuania
2000 7.13 5.09 1.40
2001 8.61 6.50 1.32
2002 8.33 6.61 1.26
2003 5.92 4.52 1.31
2004 3.74 2.69 1.39
2005 3.40 2.55 1.34
2006 3.02 2.25 1.34
2007 3.11 2.43 1.28
2008 3.11 2.38 1.30
2009 3.24 2.44 1.33
2010 3.25 2.83 1.15
2011 3.47 3.08 1.13
2012 3.21 2.72 1.18
2013 3.23 2.72 1.19
2014 3.23 2.68 1.21
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data
123
Appendix 4 (continued)
Figure 28. Tax ratios and income inequality, the Czech Republic, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (tax ratios)
Figure 29. Tax ratios and income inequality, Slovakia, 1999-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (tax ratios)
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Appendix 4 (continued)
Figure 30. Tax ratios and income inequality, Estonia, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (tax ratios)
Figure 31. Tax ratios and income inequality, Latvia, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (tax ratios)
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Appendix 4 (continued)
Figure 32. Tax ratios and income inequality, Lithuania, 2000-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (tax ratios)
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Figure 33. GDP rates, in billion US dollars, by country, 1995-2014
Source: OECD database
Figure 34. Cash transfers and income inequality, the Czech Republic, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), OECD database (for cash transfers)
127
Appendix 5 (continued)
Figure 35. Cash transfers and income inequality, Slovakia, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), OECD database (for cash transfers)
Figure 36. Cash transfers and income inequality, Estonia, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), OECD database (for cash transfers)
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Appendix 5 (continued)
Figure 37. Cash transfers and income inequality, Latvia, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), OECD database (for cash transfers)
Figure 38. Cash transfers and income inequality, Lithuania, 1995-2014
Source: SWIID 4.0 (for Gini coefficients, before 2005), Eurostat (for Gini coefficients, 2005 and
after), OECD database (for cash transfers)
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